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THE PUBLIC TRUST IN SURFACE WATERWAYS AND
SUBMERGED LANDS OF THE GREAT LAKES STATESt
Bertram C. Frey*
Andrew Mutz**
The modern public trust doctrine compels each Great Lakes state to protect the sus-
tainable future of the Lakes and to preserve traditional public uses. At the same
time, the doctrine constrains the states' powers to allow exploitation of trust re-
sources. This Article provides a brief historical overview of the public trust doctrine
in waterways and their submerged lands. It next explores how the eight Great
Lakes states have applied the doctrine, discusses the surprising number of differ-
ences in the doctrine's development from state to state, and provides comparison
charts. After analyzing the variety of approaches used by the eight states to imple-
ment the doctrine, the Article builds upon some of those approaches to craft a new
model.
The Article proposes three levels of analysis for applying the trust doctrine in the
Great Lakes states. The first level addresses the geographic scope of the doctrine in
waterways. The second level analyzes public rights of access to waterways. The
third level examines which uses of the waterways should be protected and how im-
pairments of those uses should be remedied. The Article offers new tests at each
level for implementing the trust.
While the Article argues for an expansive application of the public trust doctrine
in the Great Lakes, the Article also reviews a number of arguments about the na-
ture of the doctrine and whether it is compatible with private property rights.
Finally, the Article concludes that, if ever there was a natural system on earth so
fundamental to a region and worthy of protection under a public trust, it is the
Great Lakes system.
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The modern doctrine of public trust in waterways compels the
Great Lakes states, as trustees of the beds of the Great Lakes, their
waters, and their living contents, to ensure a sustainable future for
the lakes and to preserve their traditional public uses and natural
character.2 At the same time, the public trust doctrine constrains
the states' power to allow exploitation of trust corpus and re-3
sources.
The largest system of fresh surface water on earth, the Great
Lakes contain roughly twenty-one percent of the Earth's fresh sur-
face water.4 Of vast and irreplaceable ecological and economic
value,5 these lakes and their tributaries, their contents, and the
lands beneath and adjacent to them are subject to competing pub-
lic and private uses. Home to more than one-tenth of the
1. Generally, a public trust is defined as a right of property, real or personal, held by
one party for the benefit of the public at large or some considerable portion thereof. Good-
win v. McMinn, 44 A. 1094, 1095 (Pa. 1899); Boyce v. Mosely, 86 S.E. 771, 773 (S.C. 1915); see
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894); Il. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
"Public trust" and "charitable trust" may be considered synonymous expressions. Bauer v.
Myers, 244 F 902, 911 (8th Cir. 1917). These trusts differ from private trusts in that their
beneficiaries are uncertain and their duration is or may be perpetual. Id. at 912.
Whether or not a public trust is properly classified as a right of property has been the sub-
ject of much debate. Various authors have viewed the doctrine as grounded in trust law,
constitutional law, property law, and state police power, or considered it to be a version of
the "hard look" standard for judicial review. See Appendix A.1 for a discussion of selected
literature on the public trust doctrine.
A "waterway" or "watercourse" is generally understood to be a natural or man-made
channel through which water flows; it usually consists of flowing water, a bed, banks, and a
shore. Smith v. Cameron, 262 P. 946, 948 (Or. 1928); Louis HOUCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF NAVIGABLE RIVERS 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868). Black's Law Dictionary defines a
watercourse as follows:
A running stream of water; a natural stream fed from permanent or natural sources,
including rivers, creeks, runs, and rivulets. There must be a stream, usually flowing in
a particular direction, though it need not flow continuously. It may sometimes be dry.
It must flow in a definite channel, having a bed or banks, and usually discharges itself
into some other stream or body of water. It must be something more than a mere sur-
face drainage over the entire face of the tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets
or other extraordinary causes.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1592 (6th ed. 1990); see Leader v. Matthews, 95 S.W.2d 1138, 1139
(Ark. 1936); City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 596-600 (Cal. 1899).
2. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
3. See id.
4. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REFERENCES FOR GREAT LAKES STATISTICS,
http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/statsrefs.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2006). There are five Great
Lakes: Lake Erie, Lake Huron, Lake Michigan, Lake Ontario, and Lake Superior.
5. See GOV'T OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE GREAT LAKES: AN ENVIRON-
MENTAL ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK 7-15, 18-28 (3d ed. 1995), available at
http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/atlas (last visited Aug. 29, 2006) [hereinafter GREAT LAKES EN-
VIRONMENTAL ATLAS]; GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION STRATEGY TO RESTORE AND
PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES 1, 3, 9-14 (2005), http://www.glrc.us/documents/
strategy/GLRC=_Strategy.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2006) [hereinafter GLRC STRATEGY].
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population of the United States and over one-fourth of the popula-
tion of Canada, the Great Lakes basin "provide[s] water for
consumption, transportation, [and] power."6 In addition to sup-
porting commercial transportation and the few remaining
commercial fisheries, this watershed supports vibrant tourism and
provides water-based recreation-boating, swimming, and sport
fishing.8 As a locus of economic activity, the near-shore areas of the
lakes also harbor shipping operations and offer prime industrial
development sites."
A prodigious managerial effort-involving two federal govern-
ments, 10 eight states," two provinces, 12 numerous tribal and First
Nation governments, 13 and local governments along with citizen
action groups'4-strives to protect an already altered ecological
balance, to limit and prevent pollution, and to encourage fisheries,
particularly sport fishing. Industries and other businesses aid in
that effort by not only complying with the environmental laws but
also by implementing additional measures to further reduce and
prevent pollutants, including recycling of wastes. 15 These efforts
share the ultimate goal of restoring and maintaining the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the basin's waters.
6
6. GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 3.
7. Id. at 20.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id. at 24.
10. The Canadian and United States governments separately and jointly manage the
Great Lakes. For example, the United States and Canada have formed the Binational Pro-
gram to Restore and Protect the Lake Superior Basin. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LAKE
SUPERIOR BINATIONAL PROGRAM, http://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/lakesuperior/index.html
(last visitedJan. 24, 2007).
11. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin have laws, rules, and/or regulations pertaining to the management of the Great Lakes.
See generally discussion infra Part II and note 12.
12. For example, both Ontario and Quebec, along with the eight U.S. states that bor-
der the Great Lakes, have adopted the Great Lakes Basin Compact. Great Lakes Basin
Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419,82 Stat. 415 (1968).
13. U.S. POLICY COMM. FOR THE GREAT LAKES, GREAT LAKES STRATEGY 2002: A PLAN
FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1, 2 (2002), http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/gls/gls2002.pdf (last
visitedJan. 24, 2007).
14. Id. at 37.
15. ENV'T CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE GREAT LAKES BINATIONAL TOXIC
STRATEGY app. at A-8 (1997), http://binational.net/bns/strategyen.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2007).
16. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
767lq (2006); Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great
Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383 [hereinafter GLWQA]; Exec.
Order No. 13,340, 3 C.F.R. § 13340 (2006). See generally GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL AT-
LAS, supra note 5, at 29-37; Dan Tarlock, Five Views of the Great Lakes and Why They Matter, 15
MINN.J. INT'L L. 21, 29-31 (2006).
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The public trust doctrine provides that the state holds in trust
for the benefit of all people those submerged lands, surface waters,
and living resources that are subject to the trust, and establishes
the right of the public to enjoy trust lands, waters, and resources
for a variety of recognized public uses.1 7 The doctrine sets limita-
tions on the states, the public, and private owners, and defines the
responsibilities of the states that manage these public trust assets.1
In general, public trust waters are the "navigable waters" of the
state, and public trust lands comprise the lands beneath these wa-
ters. 19 In most coastal states, trust waters extend up to a defined
tidal high-water mark," which includes "non-navigable" tidal wa-
This Article pertains to the portion of the Great Lakes system that lies within the borders
of the United States. It offers neither a Canadian perspective nor a discussion of Canadian
law; nor does it offer a tribal or First Nation perspective.
17. The volume, scope, and breath of legal scholarship and commentary on the public
trust doctrine since 1970 are overwhelming. There are many articles and commentaries
from all regions of the United States. See infra Appendix A.2.
18. State powers to govern, supervise, and control public waterways, their submerged
lands, and their living contents-as well as state duties to manage, protect, and preserve
public and private rights in those waterways, submerged lands, and living resources-have
long been established under the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub.
Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 721 (Cal. 1983); Lane v. Harbor Comm'n, 40 A. 1058, 1061 (Conn.
1898); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Vt. 1989). Similarly, riparian owners' pri-
vate tide rights to bottomlands, shorelands, and tidelands adjacent to bodies of water held
by a state in trust for the public have long been subject to limitations, including restrictions
on impeding navigation, commerce, and fishing rights of the public. See, e.g., United States
v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
453-54 (1892); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 74-75 (1855); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 47
So. 353, 356 (Fla. 1908); City of Chicago v. Van Ingen, 38 N.E. 894, 896-97 (Ill. 1894); Opin-
ion of theJustices, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100-01 (Mass. 1981); Anderson v. deVries, 93 N.E.2d
251, 256 (Mass. 1950); Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 511-12 (Miss. 1986);
Walker v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health and Natural Res., 433 S.E.2d 767, 768 (N.C. 1993);
Mentor Harbor Yacht Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E. 2d 373, 375 (Ohio 1959);
Freeland v. Pa. R.R., 47 A. 745, 746 (Pa. 1901); Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 166 (R.I. 1895);
Doemel v.Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 397 (Wis. 1923).
19. E.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 460.
20. The term "ordinary high-water mark" (which can be a tidal or a non-tidal term) is
the point on the shore or bank up to which the "presence and action of the water is so con-
tinuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or
other easily recognized characteristic." Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005).
And, where it "is impossible or difficult to ascertain where the point of ordinary high-water
mark is [at any particular place on a bank or shore], recourse may be had to other places on
the bank or shore of the same stream or lake to determine whether a given stage of water is
above or below [the] ordinary high-water mark." Id. at 72 (alteration added) (citing Diana
Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)).
The majority of states bordering oceans generally describe the "ordinary high-water
mark" as both the upper boundary of the tidelands subject to the public trust doctrine and
the lower boundary of private tide. E.g., Abbot's Ex'r v. Doe, 5 Ala. 393, 395 (1843); City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363 n.1, 364 (Cal. 1980); Simons v. French, 25
Conn. 346, 352 (1856); Bickel v. Polk, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 325, 326 (1851); Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla.
& Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 500 (Fla. 1918); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura 517 P.2d 57, 62 (Haw.
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ters.2' The living resources inhabiting these lands and waters (e.g.,
fish and shellfish) are also held in trust by the state. In addition,
the public trust doctrine has traditionally protected the right of
public access to and along trust waters for navigation, commerce,
and fishing,23 treating the waters as public highways. 4
The common law recognizes the inherently dynamic nature of
the public trust doctrine. 25 In particular, both federal2 and state
jurisprudence 27 recognize the need for the doctrine to evolve as the
1973); Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530, 537 (1865); Wonson v. Wonson, 96 Mass. 71, 82 (1867); Con-
cord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 726 (N.H. 1889); Wismall v. Hall, 3 Paige Ch. 313, 318
(N.Y. Ch. 1832); Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 177 S.E.2d
513, 516 (N.C. 1970); Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 166 (R.I. 1895); State v. Hardee, 193 S.E.2d
497, 500 (S.C. 1972); Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 294 S.E.2d 866, 872 (Va. 1982);
Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 992-93 (Wash. 1987).
For inland states (i.e., those not bordering an ocean) that have vast navigable lakes, such
as the eight Great Lake states, the law is more complicated. For example, Michigan has
statutorily defined the ordinary high-water mark as a fixed elevation above sea level for each
of its bordering Great Lakes, with Lake Huron and Lake Michigan sharing the same level
and Lakes Superior, St. Clair, and Erie each having different levels. MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN.
§ 324.32502 (West 1999). In Ohio, the boundary on Lake Erie is defined as the natural
boundary of the lake, which fluctuates. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001).
In Illinois, the upper boundary of the public lands held in trust has been defined judicially
as being at the water's edge, which also fluctuates based on water level, erosion, or accretion.
Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 784 (Ill. 1905). Note, however, that legal import and defini-
tion of these fluctuations differ from how similar fluctuations, as a practical matter, are
treated under Ohio law.
Like some minority tidewater states, Pennsylvania allows for private ownership of shore-
lands, apparently including Lake Erie, down to the "ordinary low-water mark." Tinicum
Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 30 (1869); cf Freeland v. Pa. R.R., 47 A. 745, 746 (Pa. 1901)
(holding that title to the banks of a navigable river "vests in the owner the right of soil to
ordinary low watermark of the stream"). Nonetheless, the riparian owner holds only a quali-
fied title between the low- and high-water marks, with the public retaining trust rights for
navigation and fishing therein. Freeland, 47 A. at 746. Between the low- and high-water
marks, the private owner can use the land for his private purposes, provided that those uses
do not interfere with the public rights of navigation and fishing. Id.
21. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 480 (1988).
22. E.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1977); People v. Glenn-
Colusa Irrigation Dist., 15 P.2d 549, 552 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932); State ex rel. Gray v. Stou-
tamire, 131 Fla. 698, 704 (1938); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 98 (1851);
Sloup v. Town of Islip, 356 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (Sup. Ct. 1974); State v. Hume, 95 P. 808, 810
(Or. 1908); Stephensen v. Wood, 34 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931); Willow
River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273, 277 (Wis. 1898).
23. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (referring to
these uses as "the traditional triad of uses").
24. E.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). In Illinois Central, the court
did not discuss how it viewed the relative importance of this triad of uses, nor did it discuss
how the courts or trustees should resolve conflicts that might arise. Id.
25. E.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see
also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); I/. Cent., 146 U.S. at 460.
26. E.g., Shively, 152 U.S. at 26; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 460; AirFla., 750 F.2d at 1083.
27. E.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); Adams
v. Elliott, 174 So. 731, 734 (Fla. 1937); People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773,
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needs of society change. Just as the restrictive English test for navi-
gability (i.e., whether the waterway was tidal") became outmoded
almost two centuries ago as applied to the vast rivers and lakes of
the United States, and as the federal test for navigability (i.e.,
whether the waterway was navigable-in-fact2 9) became outmoded
for state purposes during the twentieth century, traditional state
navigability tests for applying the public trust doctrine to waterways
have become similarly outmoded in the twenty-first century.
3 0
The traditional state navigability test equates the public nature
of a waterway with navigability for commercial purposes." In
some states, this test fails to address recreational uses," which
in the Great Lakes have become more commercially valuable
33
than traditional commercial uses such as navigation for passage,34
floating saw logs to market,35 and commercial fishing.36 Secondly,
the traditional state navigability test fails to address issues con-
cerning public access to waterways.3' Thirdly, the traditional test
fails to address concerns about environmental protection,3 scenic
780 (1976); Barry v. Grela, 361 N.E.2d 1251, 1251-52 (Mass. 1977); Rushton ex rel. Hoffmas-
ter v. Taggart, 11 N.WN.2d 193, 196-97 (Mich. 1943); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143-
44 (Minn. 1893); Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986); Matthews
v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,
462 P.2d 671, 679 (Or. 1969); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989); Caminiti
v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987); State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 497-98 (Wis. 1983)
(citing Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519-20 (Wis. 1952)).
A few state courts (outside the Great Lakes basin) have been reluctant to extend protec-
tions to "new" public uses of trust lands and waters if it would impair any of the traditional
rights of commerce, navigation, or fishing. E.g., Adams, 174 So. at 734; Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974).
28. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988); Shively, 152
U.S. at 31, 49; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 435; see also discussion infra note 327.
29. E.g., Shively, 152 U.S. at 31-32; I//. Cent., 146 U.S. at 436-37; see also discussion infra
note 328.
30. Cf Brent A. Austin, The Public Trust Misapplied: Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi and
the Need to Rethink an Ancient Doctrine, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967, 1009-19 (1989). Austin believes
that the public trust doctrine should be viewed as a "flexible tool ofjudicial intervention," in
addition to a means of establishing state ownership. Id. at 1018.
31. E.g., DuPont v. Miller, 141 N.E. 423, 425 (Il. 1923); Illinois International Port Dis-
trict Act, 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1810/1 to /2 (West 2005).
32. E.g., DuPont, 141 N.E. at 426; Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 844
(Mich. 1982); Smith v. Odell, 137 N.E. 325, 326-27 (N.Y. 1922); Lakeside Park Co. v. Fors-
mark, 153 A.2d 486, 489 (Pa. 1959).
33. GLRC STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 9.
34. E.g., DuPont, 141 N.E. at 423; Smith, 137 N.E. at 326-27; Lakeside Park Co., 153 A.2d
at 489.
35. E.g., Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550, 553 (8th
Cir. 1931); Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 844.
36. E.g., Freeland v. Pa. R.R., 47 A. 745, 746 (Pa. 1901).
37. See, e.g., DuPont, 141 N.E. at 423; Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 844.
38. E.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983). Compare
Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (Wis. 1972) (expressly extending the pub-
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beauty,") and exotic invasive species, 40 all of which have substantial
commercial impact.
4'
The Great Lakes system forms a unique "world heritage" fresh-
water ecosystem that is not only especially sensitive to degradation
by a wide range of pollutants and invasive species, but also subject
to a wide range of competing public and private uses.43 Particularly
with respect to the Great Lakes system, therefore, we suggest a new
approach for determining whether and how the public trust doc-
trine applies to a waterway. This approach would be useful where a
state wished to broaden the protections afforded under the public
trust doctrine. The approach would expand the geographic scope
of the public trust's reach, as well as recognize and protect a
broader range of public uses beyond the traditional triad of naviga-
tion, commerce, and fishing.4 This approach would enhance
environmental protection and preservation. At the same time, this
approach would better address the proper scope of public access
rights and protect private, riparian interests in the waterways and
in the uplands adjacent to them.
Our approach proposes three levels of analysis. The first level
addresses the geographic scope of the doctrine's application to wa-
terways. The second level analyzes public rights of access to
waterways. The third level examines which uses of the waterways
should be protected under the doctrine and how impairments of
those uses should be addressed.
As an initial matter, we want to put our approach in perspective.
The public trust doctrine in the Great Lakes forms a background
lic trust doctrine to protect natural resources such as wetlands), with Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 844
(defining navigability in commercial terms, i.e., whether the river or stream will float a saw
log, a floating log used for commercial purposes).
39. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 711-12 732; Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095-96 (Idaho 1983); Lake of the Woods v.
Ralston, 748 N.E.2d 396, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343
(Wis. 1987).
40. See GLRC STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 9-14, 17-18.
41. Id. at 18; GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 20, 22, 29-38.
42. The term "Great Lakes System" means "all of the streams, rivers, lakes and other
bodies of water that are within the drainage basin on the St. Lawrence River at or upstream
from the point at which this river becomes the international boundary between Canada and
the United States." GLWQA, supra note 16, at art. I(h).
The water of the Great Lakes system has been variously viewed as 1) a perpetual gift from
the creator, 2) a world heritage ecosystem, 3) a natural resource, 4) a commodity, and 5) a
constrained natural resource. See Tarlock, supra note 16, at 27-36, 39-41. The public doc-
trine's treatment of the water of the lakes, for legal purposes in the United States and in the
eight Great Lakes states, appears to be consistent with each of those views. Id. at 40-41.
43. See GREAT LAKEs ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 4-5, 14-15, 29-35.
44. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1894).
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principle that underlies and reinforces the many regulatory efforts
in place to protect the waters, submerged lands, and natural re-
sources of the lakes.45 The doctrine is not a substitute for those
efforts but it does inform them. We agree with the position of
many commentators that the governmental authority that forms
the basis for the pervasive federal and state statutory laws and pro-
grams addressing the environment and natural resources, except
46in a few instances, is not grounded in the public trust doctrine.
The authority for the federal statutes and programs comes from
the Constitution,47 and the authority48 for the many state statutes
and programs derives from the inherent police power of the
states.
49
At the first level of analysis, we suggest that the waterways pro-
tected under the public trust doctrine be extended beyond those
currently protected under state tests that focus on commercial
navigability-in-fact.50 Viewing the Great Lakes in ecological terms,
the reach of the Great Lakes system's water and biota up its many
tributaries justifies an expanded geographic application of the
public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes system's rivers and
streams." In determining the proper geographic reach of the doc-
trine in waterways, we would still apply a "navigability" test, but a
more expansive one. For example, Wisconsin courts have been
leaders in applying a very broad definition of navigability, which
includes streams capable of floating a recreational boat of the shal-
lowest draft, certain artificial waters connected to navigable waters,
45. See Tarlock, supra note 16, at 40.
46. E.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631, 674-75 (1986); Charles F
Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Tradi-
tionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 467 (1989).
47. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1258, 1268 (2006) (basing its authority on
the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); see, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
48. See infra Appendix C.
49. E.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951, 954-56 (1982) (reject-
ing characterization of state power over water resources as a matter of ownership in favor of
state police power basis); Lazarus, supra note 46, at 665-68.
50. E.g., 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1810/1 to /27 (West 2005); DuPont v. Miller, 141
N.E. 423, 425 (I11. 923); Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 784 (Ill. 1905).
51. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988) (holding that, in
addition to navigable-in-fact waterways, the public trust doctrine applies to non-navigable
waterways that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, thus expanding the reach of the
doctrine).
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and, in some instances, non-navigable streams that impact naviga-
ble waters. 2
Nonetheless, expanding the doctrine's geographic scope would
not necessarily mean expanding similar rights of public access."
Although courts have traditionally protected public access rights
for navigation, commerce, and fishing, they have never instructed
the trustee on how to resolve conflicts that may arise from the ex-
ercise of public access rights. 4 Thus, while the second inquiry
should be judicial, the trustee should have some discretion to ad-
minister the trust. The court and trustee should: 1) determine
whether the particular right of access is suitable for the entire geo-
graphic area defined under the first inquiry, or portions thereof; 2)
determine during what time periods and under what circum-
stances access is suitable; 3) determine whether the right of access
promotes the sustainability of the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the waterway; 5 and 4) resolve disputes, if any, between
or among competing or conflicting rights of access.56
Thirdly, the courts and legislatures of the Great Lakes states also
could better analyze the question of whether a particular use
should be recognized as a public use to be protected under the
state's public trust doctrine. We suggest the following test for doing
so. 7 In analyzing whether a public use should be protected, the
52. Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Wis. 1974); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
53 N.W2d 514, 519 (Wis. 1952); Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res.,
412 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
53. See PAUL G. KENT & TAMARA A. DUDIAK, WISCONSIN WATER LAw: A GUIDE TO WA-
TER RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS 12 (2d ed. 2001).
54. E.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). In Illinois Central, the Su-
preme Court did not discuss its view on the relative importance of the triad of uses or how a
trustee should resolve conflicts that might arise. Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Sustainable Ecosystems: A Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 322, 335 n.60 (2006). For example, is the right of fishing to be favored over
navigation? Or, should navigation be favored over fishing?
55. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1258, 1268 (2006); GREAT LAKES ENVI-
RONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 4-5, 14-15, 29-35.
56. We are mindful that, in many instances, whether a particular access right is appro-
priate inextricably involves the question of whether a particular use is appropriate. Near
some public beaches, for example, access points for kayaks, canoes, and wind surfing might
be appropriate, but access slips for large sailboats and motorboats would be inappropriate
because of safety concerns.
57. In proposing a five-part test for determining whether a particular use should be a
protected public use under the public trust doctrine, we note by analogy that the Ohio Su-
preme Court has adopted a four-part test for determining whether a watercourse is
navigable. Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 373, 375
(Ohio 1959). See generally The Legal Institute for The Great Lakes, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Ohio (1999) (providing an overview of the public trust doctrine in Ohio).
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judicial inquiry would evaluate: 1) whether the waterway is suitable5
for use by a group of people having a common beneficial interest
in it; 2) whether the use is reasonable and intended for a proper
public purpose;' 9 3) whether the use, by itself, or in combination
with other recognized uses, promotes the sustainability of the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waterway;60 4)
whether the state has complied with its special obligation to main-
tain the trust;6' and 5) whether the use would unduly impact the
rights of private landowners, including riparian owners.62
58. An early case supporting this view is Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.
1893). In Lamprey, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that title to the beds of inland water-
ways should be established by reference to a liberalized pleasure boat test of navigability. Id.
at 1144. The ruling provoked considerable debate. In the face of subsequent federal deci-
sions indicating that the Lamprey title dispute was a question of federal law, the Minnesota
Supreme Court later recanted and adopted the federal (navigability-in-fact) test for title
purposes. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661, 686 (Minn. 1957); State ex rel. Burnquist v. Bollen-
bach, 63 N.W.2d 278, 287-88 (Minn. 1954). Currently, Lamprey has limited precedential
value with respect to the definition of navigability for purposes of determining title. Never-
theless, one California case, Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128, 132-33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1951), has cited it with approval and incorporated into California law the broad test for
navigability set forth in Lamprey to include the following uses: sailing; rowing; fishing; bath-
ing; taking of water for domestic, agricultural, and even city purposes; cutting of ice; and
other public purposes that cannot be enumerated or even anticipated. Lazarus-like, Lamprey
has re-emerged to confound its critics. See Richard M. Frank, Forever Free: Navigability, Inland
Waterways, and the Expanding Public Interest, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 579, 623-24, 628 (1983).
See generally Lazarus, supra note 46. Once a lake has been found navigable-in-fact, then Lam-
prey remains relevant in recognizing which public uses should be protected.
59. Wisconsin courts play an important role in determining whether the public trust is
being administered for the public's benefit or for a proper public purpose. See State v.
Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 577 N.W.2d 813 (Wis. 1998).
60. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1258, 1268 (2006); GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS,
supra note 5, at 29--38; see also KENT & DUDIAK, supra note 53, at 12; GREAT LAKES INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREAT
LAKES EXECUTIVE ORDER 9 (2005), http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/collaboration/final_rttp_
10282005.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter GREAT LAKES INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE REPORT].
61. SeeJoseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 473, 511 (1970); cf Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892) (recognizing judicial responsibility to examine legislative authority not only for its
general conformity to the scope of regulatory power, but also for its consonance with the
state's special obligation to maintain the public trust in Great Lakes waters).
62. See JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 158-72 (1971). The proposal
here does not go so far as to give precedence to public trust rights in ecological resources
over private rights, as originally proposed by Joseph Sax in Defending the Environment. Profes-
sor Sax has proposed what he calls a usufructary model of property rights. Joseph L. Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1441, 1452-53 (1993). Under this model, private property owners
would only have the right to use their property in a way that is "compatible with the com-
munity's dependence on the property as a resource." Id. at 1452. In doing so, it appears that
Sax has borrowed public use legal concepts, which apply far more narrowly in both public
trust law in waterways and in water rights law in states where water is abundant, and at-
tempted to generalize them to: upland beaches; water policy more generally; public land
management, wildlife, and ecological resources in general; and the takings issue. See Carol
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For some public uses, such as ice skating in winter, it would be
appropriate to extend public rights into portions of non-navigable
waters, as long as the skaters do not trespass on riparian land . On
the other hand, restricting some commercial and navigation uses
would be appropriate in view of their impact on the physical struc-
ture, ecological health, and scenic beauty of a particular waterway,
and because they would harm or adversely impact the rights of pri-
vate landowners. 4 Part III of this Article explores how each of the
three proposed levels of analysis would be applied.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the public trust
doctrine. Part II discusses how the doctrine has been applied in
each of the eight Great Lakes states and the differences among
each state's jurisprudence. This Article shows how these differences
assert themselves in terms of: 1) which states provide greater pro-
tection for the public's rights; 2) which states offer more
protection of private rights; and 3) which states are more protec-
tive of the environment and scenic beauty. This Article also
includes an appendix with a series of charts that allow the reader
to easily compare the similarities and differences in the public trust
doctrine's application and scope among the eight Great Lakes
65states. Part III of the Article provides new tests for applying the
M. Rose,Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998), reprinted and
updated in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 8, 1, 5 (2003). Even Mr. Sax has conceded that
the Supreme Court rejected his broad approach in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci
505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself The Impact of the
Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 943, 945 (1993). Sax also claims that,
in Lucas, the Supreme Court repudiates the conclusion ofJust v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d
7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972), and instead finds that it is an unreasonable exercise of the State's
police power to limit the use of private property to only natural uses for the purpose of pre-
venting harm to public fights in wetlands. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature, supra
at 1440; seeJohn Quick, The Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin, 1 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 120
(1994). In the Lucas case, the Supreme Court, however, did make it clear that a land-use
regulation-if warranted under recognized state common law "rules or understandings,"
such as common law nuisance or public trust doctrine-would not be considered a taking
even if it totally deprived an owner of all investment-based expectations. Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029-30.
63. Cf Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988) (holding that
public trust extends to all non-navigable waters that are influenced by the ebb and flow of
the tide); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal. 1983) (holding
that public trust extends to any non-navigable waterway that significantly affects the public's
interest in a larger navigable body); Austin, supra note 30, at 1003-06. The recognized pub-
lic uses of swimming, ice cutting, and skating can obviously occur in water so shallow that it
does not meet most states' navigability tests.
64. See Michigan's Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 324.32501-32515 (West 1999). Also note the policy concerns (but not the holding) of
the majority opinion in Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, 327 N.W.2d 838, 847 (Mich.
1982).
65. See infra Appendix B.
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doctrine in the eight Great Lakes states. Adapting approaches
6667 69
66 cnsi, talifrni, 6 5  Louisiana,
taken from Michigan, Wisconsin, Califora," and .o•ia 9
Part III proposes a better way to analyze which uses should be rec-
ognized and protected as rights of public use, and to what extent,
in the Great Lakes system. In our view, such an analysis better ad-
dresses recreational uses and a variety of environmental concerns,
including preservation of the scenic beauty of natural areas.7 Part
IV of this Article briefly reviews a number of critiques against an
expansion of the doctrine and examines unanswered questions
concerning the underpinnings and application of the doctrine. In
conclusion this Article emphasizes the fundamental value of the
public trust doctrine in waterways and offers some closing
thoughts.
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST IN WATERWAYS
AND THE LANDS BENEATH THEM
A common law concept 7' with roots in Roman civil law, the pub-
lic trust doctrine determines ownership of lands beneath navigable
and tidal waters.72 The doctrine also pertains to shorelands, bot-
tomlands, tidelands, tidewaters, navigable freshwater, and the
plants and animals living in these waters. 3 The state holds these
lands, waters, and wildlife in trust for the public's interest.7 4 In
66. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1704 (West 1999). "The court may grant temporary
and permanent equitable relief or may impose conditions on the defendant that are re-
quired to protect the air, water, and other natural resources or the public trust in these
resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction." Id.
67. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972).
68. State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 250 (Cal. 1981).
69. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1158 (La.
1984).
70. See state constitutions, statutes, and cases cited infra notes 76-83.
71. The evolution of the doctrine has been gradual and grounded in the common law
of each of the fifty states and in the opinions of the federal courts, particularly those of the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 30, at 981-1009; Wilkinson, supra
note 46, at 425-26.
72. DAVID C. SLADE, R. KERRY KEHOE & JANE K. STAHL, COASTAL STATES ORGANIZA-
TION, INC., PUTrING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 1-2 (2nd ed. 1997)
[hereinafter COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION] (containing a general overview of the public
trust doctrine in the United States); Steven W. Turnbull, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: Ac-
commodating the Public Need Within Constitutional Bounds, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1087 (1988).
73. See COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, supra note 72, at 5, 13-32, 67-74.
74. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-5 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 324.32501-32515 (West 1999); 11. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (apply-
ing Illinois law); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1140-41 (Minn. 1893); Smith v. City of
Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 (1883); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc.,
163 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ohio 1959); Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa.
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many states, the doctrine also protects some public rights of use ofS 75
navigable and tidal waterways for activities such as navigation,
fishing,7a fowling,77 hunting,' boating,79 ice cutting," and bathing."'
A number of states have extended the doctrine to include restric-
tions to prevent environmental harm and preserve public trust
lands and waters.82 Finally, two state constitutions, two state statutes,
and at least four state courts have recognized the public's right to
protect the scenic beauty of trust lands and waters.83
1909); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72-73 (Wis.
1978).
75. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413 (1842); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001); Iii. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453; DuPont v. Miller, 141 N.E. 423, 425
(111. 1923); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 52 (Mich. 1926); Smith v. City of Rochester, 92
N.Y 463, 482 (1883); Freeland v. Pa. R.R., 47 A. 745, 746 (Pa. 1901); State v. Bleck, 338
N.W.2d 492, 498 (Wis. 1983). The meaning of "navigation," varies among states. Compare
State ex rel. N.Y State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 954
F.2d 56, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that recreational use can establish a stream's com-
mercial navigability), with 615 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/18 (2004) (defining "public waters" as "all
open public streams and lakes capable of being navigated by water craft, in whole or in part,
for commercial uses and purposes").
76. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453; Rushton ex rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 11 N.W.2d 193, 197
(Mich. 1943); People v.Johnson, 166 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (Police Ct. 1957).
77. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 178 (Me. 1989); Hartford v. Town of Gilman-
ton, 146 A.2d 851, 853 (N.H. 1958).
78. Johnson, 166 N.Y.S.2d at 735; Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 271 N.W.2d at 72.
79. S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Idaho
1974); Adirondack League Club Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790-91 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994).
80. Hartford, 146 A.2d at 853.
81. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 (1988); Petraborg v. Zon-
telli, 15 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn. 1944); Nelson v. De Long, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1942).
82. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-1 to -23
(West 1998 & Supp. 2006); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.1701(1), .1704(1)-(3) (West
1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-3 (West 1999); State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 254
(Cal. 1981); Lake of the Woods v. Ralston, 748 N.E.2d 396, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Save
Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1158 (La. 1984); People of
the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 775 (Dist. Ct. 1972), aff'd in part and
reu'd in part on other grounds, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Term. 1973); Saxon v. Div. of State
Lands, 570 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Or. Ct. App. 1977);Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761,
778 (Wis. 1972); cf Peabody Coal Co. v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 664 N.E.2d 1171, 1174
(Ind. 1996).
83. The Hawaii and Pennsylvania state constitutions provide for the protection of
"natural beauty," HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1, and "the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment," PA. CONST. art. I, § 27, within their public trust doctrines.
Indiana statutory law provides that the "natural resources and the natural scenic beauty of
Indiana are a public right," IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-5(c) (West 1998), and that the State
holds and controls public freshwater lakes and Indiana's natural, scenic, and recreational
river systems in trust for all citizens of Indiana. Id. §§ 14-26-2-5(a)-(d)(2), 14-29-6-7. In
granting permits for proposed structures or projects impacting inland lakes and streams, the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources must consider, among other matters under the
trust doctrine, whether the structure or project would "unlawfully impair or destroy" the
aesthetics of the inland lake or stream. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.30106 (West 1999); see
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According to the Institutes of Justinian, the sea, seashore, and
rivers are "common to mankind."8'4 The public trust doctrine held
that these lands, considered a natural right, were incapable of be-
ing owned. 
s
The English common law adopted this understanding with two
major differences. First, the public trust in England included only
navigable waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, not all
navigable-in-fact waters.8 6 Second, English common law assigned an
id. § 324.1704. The courts of California, Idaho, Indiana, and Wisconsin extend the doc-
trine's reach to protect scenic beauty. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,
719 (Cal. 1983); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085,
1098 (Idaho 1983); Lake of the Woods v. Ralston, 748 N.E.2d 396, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001);
State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987); see also Quick, supra note 62, at 108;
Melissa K. Scanlan, Comment, The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of
Trust Resources: Courts, Trustees and Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 159
(2000).
84. J. INST. 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars, ed. & trans., 8th ed. 1888). The Roman law
distinction between things public and things common, acknowledged by "[b]oth Bracton
and Fleta ... call those things public which relate to the use of mankind only, and those
things common which respect all living animals indiscriminately." HENRY SCHULTES, AN
ESSAY ON AQUATIC RIGHTS 25 (1839). Schultes further examines the distinction between
things common and things public:
Where common and public rights are alluded to in the books, we consider them
usually as having the same meaning, and implying freedom. The civilians frequently
blend them together, though they profess a distinction between public, common, and
private things; this is apparent by this passage amongst many others which might be
adduced: "All rivers and ports are public, and therefore the right of fishing in a port or
river is in common" . ... Fleta, also, who transcribes copiously from the Imperial law,
says, some things are common, as the air, the sea, and sea-shore, and others are public,
as the right of fishing and using rivers and ports ....
... [T]he word publicum is derived from the word populus. Hence, if we consider
the natural advantage which accrues from a thing, we say that such a thing is com-
mon; but if we consider the use of it among men as it arises from industry, we call it a
thing public if it extends to public use, and therefore a thing may be said to be com-
mon by nature, and public by use and industry, and again by a promiscuous
intercourse and exercise of a public thing, the terms public and common, may become
convertible as experience constantly shows.
Id.
85. J. INST. 2.1 to .2; see SCHULTES, supra note 84, at 25.
86. HOUCK, supra note 1, at xiii, 8 (citing Le Case del Royall Piscarie de le Banne [The
Royal Fisheries in the River Banne], (1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 540). In River Banne, it was re-
solved:
[T]hat there are two kinds of rivers, navigable and not navigable; that every navigable
river, so high as the sea ebbs and flows in it, is a royal river, and belongs to the king, by
virtue of his prerogative; but in every other river, and in the fishery of such other
river, the ter-tenants on each side have an interest of common fight; the reason for
which is, that so high as the sea ebbs and flows, it participates of the nature of the sea,
and is said to be a branch of the sea so far as it flows.
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actual legal title holder to "every thing capable of occupancy and
susceptible of ownership. 8 7 In the case of public trust lands, this
title was bifurcated into the jus publicum and the jus privatum., The
jus publicum comprised (and still comprises) the dominant title and
the public's right to use the lands, while the jus privatum consisted
(and still consists) of the subordinate private right of possession.8 9
When the United States gained independence, the thirteen origi-
nal colonies recognized and applied the common law of England,
except where the Constitution of the United States or state consti-
tutions specifically modified it.90 None of these constitutions
mentioned public trust lands, so the English rule transferred over
into the law of the new states.9'
Originally, the English rule transferred in its entirety, and all
navigable tidal waters were considered navigable-in-law and there-
fore public trust lands. While the tidal rule may have worked
adequately for most of the original thirteen states, it was not well
adapted to the interior of the United States-with its vast numbers
of navigable lakes and mighty rivers-which are not affected by the
tides but are navigable for over a thousand miles from the sea.93 As
each new Great Lakes state entered the Union under the equal
footing doctrine enunciated in the Northwest Ordinance, it inher-
ited the public trust lands as part of attaining statehood.94 Because
HOUCK, supra note 1, at 8. Houck considers this holding dictum, and argues that, al-
though the common law tidal test was a convenient test of navigability, it was not necessarily
the only one; he also argues that, wherever a public navigation existed the rights of adjoin-
ing property owners were limited to the high-water mark and the title to the soil of the river
was in the Crown (in England) or in the states (in this country). Id. at 8-9. ContraJosEPH K.
ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES § 535 (7th ed. 1877).
87. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS 1, 17
(1826).
88. See COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, supra note 72, at 1-18; see also SCHULTES, supra
note 84, at 25.
89. E.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457-58 (1892); see COASTAL STATES
ORGANIZATION, supra note 72, at 6.
90. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11, 14-17 (1894).
91. At least two states have since amended their constitutions to include the public
trust doctrine. -Aw. CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
92. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1988).
93. E.g., Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 436.
94. Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance provides:
The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying
places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the in-
habitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any
other States that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, import, or
duty therefor.
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the interior states were affected little, if at all, by the tides under a
strict reading of the English rule, they appeared to receive almost
nothing under the public trust doctrine.
This unrealistic application of the English rule led to much liti-
gation throughout the nineteenth century.95  Federal law
determines the passage of title in these circumstances, so the
courts applied the federal test of "navigability-for-title 9 6 to the beds
of freshwater.9 In 1870 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
issue when it held in The Daniel Ball that "rivers must be regarded
as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact."98 The
expansion of the public trust doctrine to include navigable fresh-
water was recognized as the general rule in the 1876 Supreme
Court case of Barney v. Keokuk.9 With these decisions, the rule that
navigable-in-law means navigable-in-fact replaced the English tidal
rule for defining which public trust lands passed to the states when
they obtained statehood.'00 The Supreme Court determined that a
waterway was navigable-in-fact, and thus navigable-in-law, if it was
used or capable of being used in its ordinary condition as a high-
way for commerce through which trade and travel could take
place."' If a waterway met this criterion the bed of the lake or river
passed to the state upon its entrance to the Union.1
2
As to non-navigable fresh waterways, the title remained in the
United States and was unaffected by the creation of a new state.
0 3
The disposition of the beds under non-navigable, non-tidal water-
ways thus depends on the intention of the United States as
grantor.'° For example, the United States was free to retain the bed
Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) art. IV (1789) (emphasis added). Six states-
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin-entered the union after 1787; New York
and Pennsylvania were two of the thirteen original states.
95. See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473-81 (surveying various nineteenth-century Su-
preme Court cases that considered the proper application of the public trust doctrine).
96. Alaska v. United States, 563 F. Supp 1223, 1225 (D. Alaska 1983) (noting that the
navigability for title test "reflects a long-standing federal policy.., regarding who owns title
to much of the submerged land in our country").
97. E.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324,
336 (1876). In Phillips Petroleum, the most recent Supreme Court case interpreting the fed-
eral public trust doctrine, the Court held that the public trust extends to all non-navigable
waters that are influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476.
98. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
99. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) (holding that "all waters are deemed
navigable which are really so").
100. The Daniel Bal, 77 U.S. at 562.
101. Id. at 563.
102. E.g., Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 486 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
103. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 74 (1931).
104. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594 (1922).
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of the waterway when disposing of the upland.10 5 If, however, the
intention of the United States at the time of the grant was not
clearly indicated otherwise, the conveyance will be construed and
given effect in accordance with the law of the state in which the
land lies.'
0 6
The federal definition of navigable water is important in deter-
mining the scope of the public trust doctrine because the federal
definition of "navigability" determined which submerged lands
passed title (in trust for the public benefit) to the state upon its
admission to the union.0 7 Nonetheless, once a state has acquired
sovereignty over the land, the state is free to apply its own defini-
tion of navigability and to recognize or limit public trust rights as it
sees fit. 0s In general, the state has the power to use and dispose of
the lands covered by navigable waters as long as it does not impair
the public interest (e.g., for navigation, commerce, and fishing),
and subject to the commerce power of Congress.' 9
Currently in the United States, the public trust doctrine applies
to an area of over 190,000 square miles that consists of navigable
waters, non-navigable tidal waters, and the land thereunder.""
About a third of that area falls within the U.S. portion of the Great
Lakes basin. " ' The doctrine also applies to over 88,000 miles of
tidelands and over 10,000 miles of Great Lakes shoreline, for a to-
tal of over 98,000 miles of trust shorelands.1 2
105. Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77,88 (1922).
106. Hardin v.Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1891).
107. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 479. No express reference to water resources exists in
the U. S. Constitution. Federal powers, including the powers to regulate and "own" water-
ways, are derived from the Commerce Clause, the Property Clause, war and treaty powers,
the General Welfare Clause, federal preemption, the interstate compact provision, and the
original jurisdiction of the U. S. Supreme Court in suits between the states. See Bertram C.
Frey, Note, The Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URB. L. ANN. 219, 225 n.26 (1974). The
"navigability" test for a waterway can define not only the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States, for example, United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir.
1953), but also the scope of federal power to regulate commerce, for example, Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963). Pre-emptive federal authority over navigation, de-
rived from the commerce clause, enables the federal government to regulate the flow of
navigable rivers and streams. Id. at 587.
108. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475.
109. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-12, 14-17 (1894); III. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
110. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, supra note 72, at 2.
111. GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 4.
112. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, supra note 72, at 2.
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II. THE PUBLIC TRUST IN THE WATERWAYS OF THE
GREAT LAKES STATES
Over the past 200 years, the eight Great Lakes states have taken
this deceptively simple common law rule and developed it into a
complex and confusing body of law that contains a surprising
number of differences from state to state. No real minority or ma-
jority rule exists." 3 For example, some Great Lakes states have
expressly codified the common law public trust doctrine, or a por-
tion thereof, by statute, while others have not."14 Pennsylvania's
constitution expressly protects the public trust doctrine."11 Wiscon-
sin's constitution, as interpreted by the Wisconsin courts and
legislature, also contains an article that recognizes the public trust
113. We recommend the following checklist of issues to guide practitioners in analyzing
the public trust doctrine in each state: 1) What is the trust's geographic scope and how are
boundaries measured?; 2) What rights of access to waterways are protected?; 3) What are the
protected uses of trust lands and waters?; 4) Which state agency or official administers the
trust (i.e., who is the trustee)?; 5) How can the trust be enforced?; 6) Is there explicit or
implicit authority to enforce the constitutional provision, statute, regulation, or policy?; 7)
Who, in addition to the state attorney general, has standing to sue to enforce the trust?; 8)
Can the state issue licenses or leases for lands and waters held in trust, and if so, what
mechanism and procedure should be used?; 9) Does the state have the authority to convey
trust lands and waters and to terminate or diminish the public interest, and if so, how is this
done and for what purpose?; 10) Does the state have the authority to delegate trust admini-
stration to municipalities, counties, special districts, or other political subdivisions, and if so,
who has been delegated the authority and has it been limited? See THE LEGAL INSTITUTE FOR
THE GREAT LAKES, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN OHIO V (1999) (on file with authors).
114. E.g., 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 to /30 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-26-2-5, 14-29-
6-7 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 324.501a, .1615 art. I(a)(1) (West Supp. 2006); §§
.1701-05, .30106, .30108, .31514-15, .32601, .32606-07 (1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1506.10, .33 (LexisNexis 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.097(l)(c), (4)-(6) (West 2004).
Apparently relying on state police powers, Minnesota and New York have statutes that create
extensive state regulatory authorities for managing public natural resources in waterways,
submerged lands, and fish and wildlife, though the statutes do not expressly mention the
public trust doctrine. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 103A.001 to G.2212 (2005); N.Y. NAy. LAw art. §
75, art. 3 §§ 30, 37 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007); N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAw art. 6 § 75
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 2007). See infra Appendix C.
115. Pennsylvania amended its constitution in 1970 to include public trust protections:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Although the amendment is self-executing against state agencies,
Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976), it is probably not so against private entities.
SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, Developing a Suitable Water Allocation Law for Pennsylvania, 17 VILL.
ENVrL. L.J. 1, 82 (2006); see also Comment, Pennsylvania's Self-Executing Environmental
Amendment: A View of the Battle of Gettysburg, 9 URB. L. ANN. 245 (1975).
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doctrine.'1 6 Five states-Illinois (by common law), Michigan (by
statute), New York (by common law), Pennsylvania (by judicial in-
terpretation of the state constitutional provision), and Wisconsin
(by common law)-authorize citizen suits to enforce the trust doc-
trine, while the other three do not." 7
The following is a brief overview of the public trust doctrine in
each of the eight Great Lakes states and the differences among
each state's public trust jurisprudence. This overview focuses
mainly on the differences in defining the geographic extent of the
trust, the protected public access rights and uses, and the pro-
tected private riparian rights. This overview shows that some states
are more protective of public rights and others are more protective
of private rights. This overview, and the appended charts, also
identifies those states that are most protective of environmental
concerns and scenic beauty.
A. Illinois
Illinois law classifies surface waterways as either navigable or
non-navigable.1 This distinction is important because, in navigable
waters, private ownership is subject to the public's easement of
navigation.1 9 Determining whether a waterway is navigable appears
to be more difficult in Illinois than in other Great Lakes states. In
Illinois, the International Port District Act defines navigable waterways
as "public waters which are or can be made usable for water
116. WIs. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.097 (West 2004). Wisconsin's consti-
tution incorporates the following portion of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787:
[T]he river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St.
Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and
forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the United
States, without any tax, impost or duty therefor.
WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1. The Wisconsin courts have interpreted this clause as a basis of
the State's well-developed public trust doctrine. R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781,
787 (Wis. 2001); see also Quick, supra note 62, at 106-07; Scanlan, supra note 83, at 141-42.
117. Michigan Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 324.1701(1) (West 1999); Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18
(I11. 1970); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 85 N.E. 1093, 1095, 1097 (N.Y. 1908);
Payne, 361 A.2d at 272 (interpreting PA. CONST. art. I, § 27); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407,
413 (Wis. 1974); cf Bissell Chilled Plow Works v. S. Bend Mfg. Co., 111 N.E. 932, 939 (Ind.
App. 1916) (requiring a showing of specific harm rather than giving a member of the public
standing to sue). See infra Chart XI in Appendix B.
118. DuPontv. Miller, 141 N.E. 423, 425 (111. 1923).
119. Id.
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commerce."' 2° Whether the waters are useable for water commerce
depends on whether they are sufficiently deep to be a useful chan-
121nel for commerce.
Unlike some of the other Great Lakes states-such as Michigan,
Wisconsin, and Minnesota-Illinois does not use the "floatable"
definition of navigability.22 In other words, the fact that there is
enough water for row boats or small skiffs to pass over the water
does not necessarily render the waters navigable in Illinois. 23 A wa-
terway is not barred from being navigable, however, just because
artificial means must be employed to make the waterway suitable
for commercial navigation. 4
In Illinois, the title to the bed of Lake Michigan and all mean-
dered lakes, regardless of location, size, or shape, 25 is held in trust
for the people.2 6 Shore owners on Lake Michigan and meandered
lakes hold title only to the water's edge.127 A non-meandered lake,
however, may still be considered navigable. The applicable test in
this case is whether the lake may "furnish[] a highway over which
commerce ... might [be] carried on in the [usual manner].' 28
Shore owners possess the right of access from their land to the lake
within the width of their premises bordering the lake.'2 Shore
owners, however, cannot increase the boundary of their property
"by building out into the lake for that purpose."3" One exception
exists to this rule. The State may issue a permit to any municipality
to fill public waters for the purpose of constructing water purifica-
tion plants, wharves, piers, or levees.13' The municipality then gains
absolute title to these lands in fee simple. In addition, natural
accretion on lakes belongs to the riparian owner.1
3 3
120. 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1810/2 (West 2005).
121. DuPont, 141 N.E. at 425; Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 785 (Ill. 1905).
122. DuPont, 141 N.E. at 425.
123. Schulte, 75 N.E. at 785.
124. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 147 N.E.2d 708, 710-11 (Il. App. Ct. 1957).
125. See 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2004) (incorporating by reference Div. OF WATER-
WAYS, ILL. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS & BLDGS., MEANDERED LAKES IN ILLINOIS (1962)). The
term "meandered" means following the sinuosities of a waterway. See Niles v. Cedar Point
Club, 175 U.S. 300, 306 (1899).
126. See615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2004).
127. See Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123, 124 (Il1. 1917); Hammond v. Shepard, 57 N.E.
867, 868 (Il1. 1900). This "water's edge rule" is unique to Illinois; all the other states, except
Ohio, apply some semblance of a high-water or low-water mark rule. See discussion infra
Parts II.A-H.
128. State v. New, 117 N.E. 597, 599 (Ill. 1917).
129. Revell v. People, 52 N.E. 1052, 1057 (I11. 1898).
130. Brundage, 117 N.E. at 127.
131. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-117-11 (West 2005).
132. Id.
133. See RevelI, 52 N.E. at 1057.
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The rights of riparian owners on Lake Michigan (a navigable
lake) and all meandered lakes (whether natural or created by a
governmental body) are absolute only to the water's edge, at which
point they become subject to the rights of the public. 34 For exam-
ple, the public has an easement for the purpose of navigation on
navigable lakes, including meandered lakes.1 35 With regard to pri-
vate, non-navigable lakes, Illinois applies the civil law rule wherein
ownership of a part of the lakebed entites such owner to the "rea-
sonable use and enjoyment of the surface waters of the entire lake
provided they do not unduly interfere with the reasonable use of
the waters by other owners.,1
3 6
With respect to all navigable waters (i.e., both lakes and rivers),
it is unlawful to erect any structure or fill, deposit any matter, or
build wharves or piers without acquiring a State permit.' The only
exception to this rule is for duck blinds built in accordance with
State requirements.
38
In the case of rivers and streams, unless clearly stated to the con-
trary, a grant of title carries with it title out to the center of the
stream. 139 This is true whether or not the stream is navigable. 40 If
the same person owns both sides of the stream, she owns the entire
width of the river that intersects her property. 4 1 On navigable-in-
fact rivers and streams, title is only absolute to the water's edge be-
cause the public retains an easement of navigation over these
waters.
142
Finally, in Illinois the right to hunt and fish is not incident to the
public easement of navigation, but rather is connected with owner-
ship of the soil underlying the waterway. '3 Although the fish and
134. Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 784 (Ill. 1905).
135. DuPontv. Miller, 141 N.E. 423, 425 (Ill. 1923).
136. Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass'n, 526 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ill. 1988) (also
discussing in detail the historical development of the common law rule and the civil law rule
in the various states). In contrast, the common law rule holds that an owner of a portion of a
non-navigable lake bed can exclude all others from the waters overlying that portion of the
lake. Id. at 156.
137. 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18 (2004).
138. Id.
139. Carter Oil Co. v. Delworth, 120 F.2d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1941); Sikes v. Moline Con-
sumers' Co., 127 N.E. 342, 344 (Ill. 1920); Allott v. Wilmington Light & Power Co., 123 N.E.
731, 734 (Ill. 1919); Town of Cicero v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R., 110 N.E. 811, 812 (Il.
1915); Albany R.R. Bridge Co. v. People ex rel. Matthews, 64 N.E. 350, 353 (Ill. 1902); Trs. of
Sch. v. Schroll, 12 N.E. 243, 244 (Ill. 1887).
140. Houck v. Yates, 82 Ill. 179, 181 (1876); Kessinger v. Standard Oil Co., 245 Ill. App.
376, 381 (App. Ct. 1925).
141. Wash. Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 Ill. 46,52 (1881).
142. Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 787 (Ill. 1905).
143. Id. at 786 (citing Beckman v. Kreamer, 43 111. 447 (1867)).
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birds do not become the property of the soil owner, that owner has
the absolute right to hunt and fish in the waters and on the land.
1 44
In other words, if the waters are navigable-in-fact, the public enjoys
only an easement of passage over them, while every other benefi-
cial use inheres in the owner of the soil.' 45 In many cases, however,
the State actually owns, or more precisely holds in trust, the bed of
the waterway; in that case, a public right of fishing and hunting
exists alongside that of navigation.
14 6
B. Indiana
Indiana has some of the more confusing public trust jurispru-
dence of the eight Great Lakes states. Indiana law treats rivers and
lakes differently. The State's most recent definition, with no fur-
ther explanation, is that navigable-in-law is navigable-in-fact.4 The
definition of navigability appears less important because it gener-
ally applies only to rivers and streams, and then only when the
legislature has not explicitly ruled on the river's or stream's navi-
gability. 48 Indiana defines the lakes that are public freshwater lakes
and regulates these lakes by statute.
49
As in Illinois, and indeed all Great Lakes states, Indiana holds
the title to the bed of Lake Michigan in trust for the public. 0 Un-
der Indiana law, a riparian owner on the banks of Lake Michigan
may not fill in property or construct a dock or wharf beyond the
dock or harbor line established by the United States. 5' Any owner
of land along Lake Michigan, or owner of an easement for the
purposes of a public park over private property, may acquire the
title to the submerged land between his property line and the dock
or harbor line only if Indiana grants a permit. 51 Upon obtaining a
State permit, the property owner may fill the land between the
shore and the dock or harbor line, provided that the fill does not
contain hazardous waste. 5' The filled land can then be patented,
and the patent vests the title in fee simple.
54
144. Schulte, 75 N.E. at 786.
145. Id. at 787.
146. Id.
147. State ex rel. Ind. Dep't of Conservation v. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. 1950).
148. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-29-1-1, 14-29-1-2(b) (West 1998).
149. Id. at § 14-26-2.
150. Lake Sand Co. v. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 120 N.E. 714, 715 (Ind. App. 1918).
151. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-18-6-1, -3 (West 1998).
152. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-18-6-2, -4 (West 1998).
153. Id. at § 14-18-6-5.
154. Id. at §§ 14-18-6-6, -7.
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The State retains full control over public freshwater lakes and
holds these lakes in trust for the use of its citizens. 55 In defining
whether the lakes are public, Indiana statutory law makes no dis-
tinction between navigable lakes and non-navigable lakes.156 If,
however, they are deemed public by the legislature, or if the ripar-
ian owner acquiesces to the public's use of his property, 57 then
State law considers the lakes to be public. Accordingly, riparian
owners of land adjacent to a public freshwater lake do not enjoy
the exclusive right to use the lake or any of its parts.'5 If the waters
of a public freshwater lake have receded from natural causes, the
riparian owner possesses the rights to accretions.' 59 In addition, the
State may issue a permit for the alteration of the shoreline and/or
the bed of a public lake. 160 The riparian owner along a public lake
may maintain a pier or wharf, as long as it does not interfere with
the public's rights.' ' Instead of a rigid application using depth or
length to determine where such wharf-out rights end, State statu-
tory laws employ a reasonableness inquiry on a case-by-case basis.
62
Under Indiana law, a lake is private and non-navigable if it is
"enclosed" and "bordered by riparian ... owners. " l1 3 For these pri-
vate lakes, Indiana applies the common law rule that "[e]ach
owner has the right to the free and unmolested use and control of
his portion of the lake bed and water thereon for boating and fish-
ing."'6 Therefore, a riparian owner on a private lake only enjoys
the right to use the waters over the land to which he actually holds
title. 65 Such a riparian owner takes title to all land included in the
subdivision of which his land is a part. 66 This means that he takes
the land beneath the water far enough beyond the water's edge or
the meander line to round out the full subdivision of his land.
6 7
For rivers and streams, both common law and statutory law
make distinctions regarding private and public rights and uses
155. Id. at § 14-26-2-5(d).
156. Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
157. Id.
158. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-5(e) (West 1998).
159. Id. at § 14-26-2-8.
160. Id. at § 14-26-2-23.
161. Bath, 459 N.E.2d at 76.
162. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-29-1-4, -8 (West 1998).
163. Bath, 459 N.E.2d at 75.
164. Carnahan v. Moriah Prop. Owners Ass'n, 716 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind. 1999) (quoting
Sanders v. De Rose, 191 N.E. 331, 333 (Ind. 1934)).
165. Id.
166. Tolleston Club ofChi. v. Carson, 123 N.E. 169, 174-75 (Ind. 1919); Stoner v. Rice,
22 N.E. 968,969 (Ind. 1889).
167. 7blleston, 123 N.E. at 174-75.
SUMMER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
based upon whether the waterway is navigable. 68 Specifically, pri-
vate ownership and the public rights to recreation and commercial
use of the surface water depend on navigability.' 9 The legislature
has delegated the authority to determine whether or not a local
river or stream is navigable. 7 ' On the petition of twenty-four free-
holders that reside near the stream in question, a board of
commissioners for each county possesses statutory power to declare
a river or stream navigable. 7' A board will declare the stream navi-
gable if: 1) a suitable person of the board's choice determines that
the stream is navigable; and 2) the board determines that the navi-
gable stream is useful to the public.7 2 A stream, however, can be
navigable even if it is not classified as such by the legislature or by a
county board.7 1 Some State regulatory functions, such as filling
and permitting permanent docks, also depend on a determination
of navigability.1
4
The seminal case for determining navigability in Indiana rivers
and streams is State ex rel. Indiana Department of Conservation v.
Kivett. 75 In Kivett, the Indiana Supreme Court conclusively set forth
the following test for navigability:
Whether or not a stream is navigable is an issue of fact and
depends upon whether or not it was available and was suscep-
tible for navigation according to the general rules of river
transportation at the time Indiana was admitted to the Union.
It does not depend upon whether it is now navigable ....
... The true test seems to be the capacity of the stream,
rather than the manner or extent of use.
76
168. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 14-29-1-8 (West 1998); State ex rel. Ind. Dep't of Conser-
vation v. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. 1950); Bissell Chilled Plow Works v. S. Bend Mfg.
Co., 111 N.E. 932, 939 (Ind. App. 1916).
169. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-29-1-1 to 14-29-8-5. (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); Brophy v.
Richeson, 36 N.E. 424, 425 (Ind. 1894); Patton Park, Inc. v. Pollak, 55 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ind.
App. 1944).
170. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-29-1-1 (West 1998).
171. Id. at § 14-29-1-2.
172. Id.
173. Martin v. Bliss, 5 Blackf. 35, 35 (Ind. 1838).
174. § 14-29-1-8. A permit is typically required from the Indiana Department of Natural
Resources before a person can "place, fill, or erect a permanent structure in;" "remove water
from;" or "remove material from" a navigable waterway. Id. The applicability of other State
regulatory functions also depend on whether the waterway is navigable. See, e.g., §§ 14-29-1-8,
14-29-3-8, 14-29-4-5.
175. State ex rel. Ind. Dep't of Conservation v. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d 145 (Ind. 1950).
176. Id. at 148.
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Indiana courts recognize two classes of navigable rivers, one for
certain kinds of vessels within the State and for waterways not used
in interstate commerce, and the other for interstate commerce on
navigable-in-fact rivers. 177 The State retains exclusive jurisdiction
over the first class of streams and rivers and may authorize obstruc-
tions of them for the public good.7 8 As for the second class of
rivers, the State retains the same rights as in the first class of rivers,
subject to the power of Congress to regulate them for interstate
commerce.' 79 For both classes of navigable rivers, private title ex-
tends to the low-water mark and includes the right to wharf out
(e.g., to erect piers for the purpose of mooring boats) to aid navi-
gation. o
For non-navigable rivers, private title extends to the thread of
the stream.'8 ' Regardless of whether the waterway is public or pri-
vate, all riparian owners possess rights of access, swimming, fishing,
bathing, and boating, as long as such uses are reasonable.
In addition to navigability as a standard for determining riparian
and public rights to rivers and streams, Indiana's legislature has
statutorily defined "natural,"83 "scenic,"8 4 and "recreational'8 5 river
systems and set forth rules and policies for each as to riparian
rights and public use.1
8 6
C. Michigan
Michigan law relies on the "saw log" test (i.e., whether a water-
way will actually float a saw log) to determine navigability.8 7 This is
177. Depew v. Bd. of Trs., 5 Ind. 8, 9 (1854).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 10.
180. Ross v. Faust, 54 Ind. 471, 474 (1876).
181. Brophy v. Richeson, 36 N.E. 424, 425-26 (Ind. 1894). But see Bath v. Courts, 459
N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (purporting to follow Brophy, but using the term "middle"
of the stream rather than "thread" of the stream). These terms can be synonymous, but they
are not necessarily so. For example, one Indiana case explicitly refers to the "thread" of the
"middle" of a stream, implying that the thread is a sinuous line running down the deepest
channel of the stream. Earhart v. Rosenwinkel, 25 N.E.2d 268, 272 (Ind. App. 1940).
182. Zapffe v. Srbeny, 587 N.E.2d 177, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
183. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-29-6-8 (West 1998).
184. Id. at § 14-29-6-4.
185. Id. at § 14-29-6-2.
186. Id. at § 14-29-6-1, to -15 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006). Indiana recognizes the public's
right to preserve the natural scenic beauty of public freshwater lakes and to participate in
recreational activities on the lakes. Lake of the Woods v. Ralston, 748 N.E.2d 396, 401 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001).
187. Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 859 (Mich. 1982).
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one of the easier tests to apply in the Great Lakes states. Navigabil-
ity is integral in Michigan for determining the extent of riparian
ownership on lakes and streams, and it influences the extent to
which the State will afford environmental protection. 81 Statutory
law determines ownership of the submerged lands in the Great
Lakes, while the common law determines ownership of the beds of
inland lakes and streams. 89
With respect to the Great Lakes, the administrative rules imple-
menting The Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act 90 define Michigan's
public trust doctrine as "the perpetual duty of the [S] tate to secure
to its people the prevention of pollution, impairment or destruction
of its natural resources, and the rights of navigation, fishing, hunting
and use of its lands and waters for other public purposes."' 9' The
statute covers all unpatented bottomlands and human-made lands
in the Great Lakes-including the bays and harbors thereof-that
belong to the State or are held in trust by the State, as well as filled
lands. 92 The Act allows for the sale, lease, or other disposition of
the unpatented bottomlands and permits, filling submerged lands
as long as the fill does not substantially 1) affect public use of the
lands (i.e., hunting, fishing, swimming, or navigation) or 2) dam-
age the public trust in the submerged lands. 93 A riparian owner
must obtain a State permit before dredging or placing any materi-
als on the bed of the Great Lakes. 94 Even if a private owner's title
extends into the water, the public's rights of navigation on the
Great Lakes include the right to walk on the lakeside of the ordi-
nary high-water mark.'95 Michigan case law defines the ordinary
high-water mark as "the point on the bank or shore up to which
the presence and action of the water is so continuous as to leave a
distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegeta-
tion, or other easily recognized characteristic."' 96
The navigability of an inland waterway (i.e., a lake, river, or
stream) depends on its potential for commercial use.97 Michigan
188. Pigorsh v. Fahner, 177 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970), aff'd, 194
N.W.2d 343 (Mich. 1972).
189. MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 324.32502 (West Supp. 2006).
190. MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 281.960 (West 1959) (repealed 1994). This codification
has been replaced by MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.32501 to .32516 (West Supp. 2006),
but it still provides a useful definition of the State's public trust doctrine and a description of
how it applies.
191. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.322.1001 (m) (1999).
192. MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 324.32501 to .32516 (West Supp. 2006).
193. Id. at § 324.30106.
194. Id. at § 324.32505.
195. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Mich. 2005).
196. Id. at 72.
197. Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Mich. 1982).
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courts have explicitly rejected the recreational use test. 98 The ri-
parian owner of a navigable inland lake holds qualified title to the
center of the lake.' 99 If the public has a lawful means of accessing
the lake, then the riparian owner's title is subject to the public's
right of navigation,0 which includes a right to fish.2' For navigable
inland lakes, the riparian owner's absolute title extends only to the
high-water mark, even if the water is unfit for navigation because of
aquatic plants or other natural obstructions. 2
Michigan law allows private ownership of inland lakes. For ex
ample, isolated lakes completely surrounded by private land
without public access are considered privately owned. The fact• . • •205
that there is a navigable ingress and egress is immaterial. When
the lake is considered non-navigable under the commercial use• • •206
test, the question of public access also becomes immaterial. Fur-
thermore, Michigan applies the "civil rule" that, where there are
several riparian owners of the same inland lake, the owners may
use the entire surface for boating and fishing, as long as they do
not interfere with the reasonable use of the water by other riparian
207owners.
As mentioned above, the commercial use test also applies to riv-
ers and streams. 2 s To be navigable, the river or stream must be able
to float logs.20 9 The definition of navigability is only useful for de-
termining whether the public has a right of navigation over those
waters.2 0 This is due to the fact that the riparian owners hold title
to the riverbed up to the thread of the stream,2 " whether the river
is navigable or non-navigable. For navigable rivers, this title is
subject to the navigational servitude, and fishing is the only
198. Id.
199. McCardel v. Smolen, 250 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), affd in part &
vacated in part, 273 N.W.2d 3 (Mich. 1978).
200. Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 841.
201. Putnam v. Kinney, 227 N.W. 741, 741 (Mich. 1929).
202. People v. Warner, 74 N.W. 705, 710 (Mich. 1898).
203. Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 841.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Mich. Conference Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 245
N.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
207. Putnam v. Kinney, 227 N.W. 741, 741 (Mich. 1929).
208. Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 841.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 845.
211. Id. at 841; Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 117 (Mich. 1926). In Bott, the court
equates the "thread" of a stream with its "midpoint." Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 841.
212. Sewers v. Hacklander, 188 N.W. 547, 549 (Mich. 1922).
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recognized recreational use."3 Riparian rights include the right of
access to the water, the right to build a pier out to the point of
navigation, and the right to reasonable use of the waters.1 4
D. Minnesota
Under Minnesota law, the classification of water as navigable or
non-navigable determines whether the surface waters are owned
publicly or privately.2 15 Minnesota uses one of the more easily ap-
plied definitions of navigability. For the purpose of determining
tide to inland waterways, Minnesota law considers a waterway to be
navigable if it meets the federal, navigable-in-fact test.21 6 Navigabil-
ity, in turn, establishes the extent to which a riparian owner can
claim title to the bed of any waterway.1 7 Statutory law defines the
title to beds of navigable waterways, while the common law deter-
2181mines the rights of riparian owners.
With respect to the Minnesota portion of Lake Superior and all
other navigable lakes, the State holds in trust the title to the area
below the low-water mark.2 9 The area between the low-water mark
and high-water mark is subject to both the jus publicum and the jus
privatum.2 2 0 Consequently, the State owns a limited interest in trust
for protecting public uses such as commercial navigation, recrea-
tional activity, and the drawing of water for various public and
private uses,22 ' but not for building a public highway across this
area of land.22
Even though "meandered lakes are not necessarily navigable
lakes," they still "belong to the [SItate in its sovereign capacity in
213. Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 841.
214. Tennant v. Recreation Dev. Corp., 249 N.W.2d 348, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
215. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139,1143 (Minn. 1893) (finding this division to be "a
classification which, in some form, every civilized nation has recognized").
216. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661, 683, 686 (Minn. 1957) (navigability-for-title case);
State ex rel. Burnquist v. Bollenbach, 63 N.W.2d 278, 287 (Minn. 1954) (same); see discussion
supra note 58. Once a waterway has been deemed navigable-in-fact, Lamprey remains relevant
in deciding which public uses should be protected. Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143.
217. Adams, 89 N.W.2d at 680.
218. See MINN. STAT. § 103G.711 (2005). See generally State v. Korrer, 148 NW. 617
(Minn. 1914) (containing a good overview of Minnesota's common law decisions regarding
the public trust).
219. Korrer, 148 N.W. at 621.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 623-24.
222. State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.w.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1971) (finding the build-
ing of a state highway over this area of land as a taking and not a protected use incident to
water navigation, commerce, or fishing).
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trust for the public., 223 Thus, for non-navigable meandered lakes,
the State holds the land below the low-water mark in trust for the
public, just as it does with navigable lakes that serve a beneficial
public purpose.2 As to both kinds of public lakes, "a mutual right
of enjoyment exists between and is shared by riparian owners and
the public generally."22 5 Accordingly, recreational uses on public
lakes-such as boating, bathing, hunting, fishing, skating, and cut-
ting ice-are shared, and the riparian proprietor enjoys no
exclusive privileges.2
Riparian owners hold the title to the low-water mark; however,
their title is absolute only to the high-water mark.22 ' Riparian own-
ers may deny access to and from the water on their particular
property and they retain the right to wharf out to navigable wa-
ters.228 For those few lakes that do not meet the beneficial public
purpose test, the riparian owner takes title to the center of the
lake; in these instances, Minnesota applies the civil rule, which en-
titles riparian owners to reasonable use of the entire lake.2  In
determining reasonable use, Minnesota courts consider several fac-
tors, including the type of use, the importance of the use, and the
size of the waterway.230
With respect to rivers and streams, Minnesota applies the float-
ing log test.2 1 1 If a body of water can float logs and timber in
substantial quantities during the proper season, then Minnesota
law considers the river or stream to be navigable and public.22 The
logs need not be guided by man, nor does the stream have to be
233navigable during all seasons. Unlike in Michigan, this is not a
strictly commercial use test (i.e., the floating log does not have to
be a saw log going to market); boating and sailing for pleasure
constitute navigation and suffice to establish navigability.2 34 The
State owns the land under all navigable rivers in fee simple, subject
223. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661,687 (Minn. 1957).
224. The authors found no case that defines the term "beneficial public use" in this
context.
225. Petraborg v. Zontelli, 15 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn. 1944).
226. Petraborg, 15 N.W.2d at 180; Nelson v. De Long, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1942).
227. Head, 185 N.W.2d at 532.
228. Id.
229. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
230. Petraborg, 15 N.W.2d at 182.
231. Id.
232. Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550, 553 (8th Cir.
1931).
233. Minn. Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co., 107 N.W. 405,410 (Minn. 1906).
234. Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143.
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to the public's right of navigation and lawful use while on and in
the waters.3 5
E. New York
Alone among Great Lakes states, New York has attempted to
maintain some semblance of the English common law tidal test. In
determining the rights of a private owner as opposed to the public,
New York distinguishes between: (1) non-tidal, navigable-in-fact
rivers and streams, and (2) waters deemed navigable-in-law, which
New York defines narrowly as tidal, navigable-in-fact waters.2 3 6 New
York recognizes fewer public rights in the former waterways than in
the latter. As for navigable boundary lakes, including Lake Erie and
Lake Ontario, New York law vests title in the State for the public
trust, even though these lakes are non-tidal.237
New York's public trust doctrine is one of the least protective of
public rights among the Great Lakes states. While New York vests
title to the beds of Lakes Erie and Ontario in the State for the pub-
lic trust, the State can still convey away these lands. The
legislature may grant these lands for "public, or such other pur-
poses as it may determine to be for the best interests of the
[S] tate."23 9 This means, for example, that the State may grant these
bottomlands to a railroad company for the construction of a rail-
road line.2 40 At the same time, New York has retained fewer
interests in most of its waterways, and therefore does not hold title
to convey away in most instances. 24' This severely limits the useful-
ness of the doctrine in New York.
In some respects, New York's jurisprudence concerning the pub-
lic trust appears simpler than the laws of other Great Lakes states,
and in other ways more complex. For example, New York treats
navigable-in-fact rivers and inland lakes under the same rules, but
it attempts to maintain some distinction between tidal, navigable-
235. MINN. STAT. § 103G.711 (Supp. 2005).
236. Douglaston Manor v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 203 (N.Y 1997).
237. Saunders v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 38 N.E. 992, 994 (N.Y 1894); see Ful-
ton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 94 N.E. 199, 202-03 (N.Y 1911).
238. See People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521, 526-27 (N.Y. 1916).
239. Saunders, 38 N.E. at 994.
240. Id. As applied to the ocean's foreshore, New York courts have found, under the
public trust doctrine, that large grants of land to private individuals (such as eleven miles of
the foreshore) are ultra vires and void. Romeo v. Sherry, 308 F. Supp. 2d 128, 142 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (citing Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 5 N.E.2d 824, 825 (N.Y.
1936)); Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (N.Y. 1895). "The land between the high and low
water marks is often referred to as 'the foreshore.'" Romeo, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 132 n.5.
241. See Saunders, 38 N.E. at 994.
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in-law rivers and non-tidal, navigable-in-fact rivers and lakes.242 New
York law determines navigability based on the waterway's usefulness
as a commercial highway. 43 New York also considers recreational
uses when determining whether a stream or lake would serve a
commercial purpose. 4 While the commercial use standard re-
mains, recreational uses provide evidence of commercial
usefulness.4 5 When New York law deems a stream or lake navigable-
in-fact, the public enjoys an implied right of passage.246
In the case of non-tidal, navigable-in-fact rivers and inland lakes,
New York applies a strong presumption that the riparian owner
holds tide to the center of the stream or lake.24 ' This tide, however,
is subject to the public right of navigation and to the State's right
to regulate and control the water for navigation.2 48 This public
easement of passage includes the right to use the bed of the stream
up to the high-water mark to detour around natural objects and, if
necessary, to portage.2 9 In regard to these non-tidal, navigable-in-
fact waterways, New York courts have explicitly stated that this right
of passage is merely an easement of navigation, and nothing more:
"the easement of passage over navigable waters does not involve a
surrender of other privileges which are capable of enjoyment with-
out interference with the navigator. 2 51 While the public may pass
over these waters, the riparian owner maintains some exclusive
rights, such as private fishery rights or use of the water for a fac-
tory.2 5' Furthermore, the State may only improve non-tidal,
navigable-in-fact rivers for public purposes of commerce and navi-
gation.2 2 For example, diverting the waters from one navigable-in-
fact river to a canal does not serve the public purpose of navigation
over the river in question, and is consequently not acceptable. In
the case of non-navigable-in-fact rivers, the same rules apply, except
without the public easement of navigation.5
242. Calkins v. Hart, 113 N.E. 785, 785 (N.Y. 1916).
243. Van Cortlandt v N.Y. Cent. R.R., 192 N.E. 401, 402 (N.Y. 1934).
244. Adirondack League Club Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788, 791 (1994).
245. Id.
246. Douglaston Manor v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 204 (N.Y. 1997).
247. Calkins, 113 N.E. at 785.
248. Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 473 (1883).
249. Adirondack League Club, 615 N.YS.2d at 792-93. This means that navigability is not
automatically destroyed by occasional natural obstructions or portages. Id.
250. Smith v. Odell, 137 N.E. 325, 327 (N.Y. 1922).
251. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (N.Y 1911).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 202.
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Two major caveats exist to New York's navigability rules, which
pertain to the beds of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers. The beds of
those rivers vested in the State through means other than the pub-
lic trust doctrine, and the State never conveyed them away. 255 The
State has the authority to convey away these bottomlands, but it has
not done So.256 Accordingly, the public retains more expansive
rights than simple navigation and may use these waters in more
ways than other non-tidal, navigable-in-fact waterways.
2 57
E Ohio
Unique among Great Lakes states, Ohio's common law public
trust jurisprudence uses a factor-weighing approach to define navi-
gability.2 58 This determines who owns the beds of rivers and inland
lakes and the extent of riparian rights. 2' 59 Ohio statutory law, how-
ever, determines ownership of the bed of Lake Erie. 60
The waters of Lake Erie below the natural shoreline and the
submerged soil up to the Canadian border belong to Ohio in trust
for the people, subject to the powers of the United States as well as
the public rights of navigation, fishing, and commerce. 6' Ohio also
has codified permissible public and private uses of the land that
lies lakeward of Lake Erie's natural shoreline. If the State deter
mines, upon the recommendation of the Ohio Department of
Natural Resources, that any part of the territory of Lake Erie can
be developed, improved, or utilized without impairment of the
aforementioned public rights, the State can lease all or part of its
interest in the lake's bottomlands.263
For other waterways, the Ohio Supreme Court enunciated four
factors to be considered when determining navigability: 1) capacity
for boating in the waterway's natural condition, 2) accessibility by
public termini, 3) capacity for boating after making reasonable
improvements, and 4) capacity for recreational or commercial
255. Canal Comm'rs v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 Wend. 423, 447-48 (N.Y. 1830); see Fulton,
94 N.E. at 202-03.
256. Canal Comm'rs, 5 Wend. at 447-48; see Fulton, 94 N.E. at 201-02.
257. Canal Comm'rs, 5 Wend. at 460-62.
258. Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ohio
1959); see LEGAL INST. FOR THE GREAT LAKES, supra note 113.
259. Mentor Hai-or Yachting Club, 163 N.E.2d at 375.
260. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001).
261. Id.; Mitchell v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 507 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ohio 1987);
see 1993 OHIO Op. ATrr'y GEN. 2-128.
262. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001).
263. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11 (LexisNexis 2001).
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boating. In addition, the court held that a natural, temporary
obstruction does not destroy the otherwise navigable character of a
waterway and that a natural waterway does not lose its navigability
because part of it has been artificially constructed. 2 6  Nor is the
channel of a naturally navigable watercourse made public because
of reasonable improvements of it. Nevertheless, "[a] lake which is
not really useful for navigation, although of considerable size com-
pared with ordinary fresh-water streams, may be private
property. ,16' A lake can also become public if the riparian owners
so dedicate it, but "[p] rivate owners are not to be deemed to have
devoted their property to [public uses] simply because they inter-
posed no objections.,
26
Regardless of whether a river or lake is deemed navigable, Ohio
law recognizes a presumption that the riparian owner holds title to
the middle of the stream or the center of the lake.2 69 Exceptions
include Lake Erie, where the littoral owner has title of the land to
the natural shoreline,2 " and the Ohio River, where private title ex-
2711tends to the low-water mark. If a river or lake is considered
navigable under the aforementioned factors, then the waterway is
subject to a public easement of navigation, which includes public
fishery rights. 7 3 When a waterway is considered navigable, the
264. Mentor Harbor Yachting Club, 163 N.E.2d at 374; State ex reL Brown v. Newport Con-
crete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
265. Mentor Harbor Yachting Club, 163 N.E.2d at 377, 378.
266. Id. at 377.
267. See Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 688 (Ohio 1890).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 688-89; Lamb v. Ricketts, 11 Ohio 311, 315 (1842).
270. State ex reL Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 725 (Ohio 1948). The natu-
ral shoreline is defined as the line where water usually stands undisturbed. Sloan v.
Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492, 512 (1878). For purposes of this Article, the term "littoral" means
"[b]elonging to shore, as of seas and great lakes." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 934 (6th ed.
1990) (citing Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191,1195 (Alaska 1973)); see also Glass v. Goeckel,
703 N.W.2d 58, 61 n.1 (Mich. 2005) (noting that, because the common law of the seas ap-
plies to the Great Lakes, it will extend the term "littoral," which more commonly applies to
seas and their coasts, to shoreland of the Great Lakes).
271. See Lembeck, 24 N.E. at 689. The low-water mark, however, does not form the
boundary of the State of Ohio's title on the Ohio River. In determining the border between
Ohio and Kentucky under the Ohio River, the federal courts have applied the "thalweg
rule." Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335, 340 (1980). The thalweg of a river refers to the line
drawn to join the lowest points along the entire main channel of the watercourse. Clark v.
Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1931). Thus, as to
the Ohio River, the State holds title to the portion of the riverbed from the low-water mark
on the banks to the thalweg of the river. We could find no case law addressing the nature of
that title.
272. Walker v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 16 Ohio 540, 544 (1847).
273. E. Bay Sporting Club v. Miller, 161 N.E. 12, 13 (Ohio 1928); Bodi v. Winous Point
Shooting Club, 48 N.E. 944 (Ohio 1897).
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riparian owner retains the right to wharf out to the point of navi-
gability, but the owner cannot interfere with the public's right of
navigation or fishery. 4 Moreover, the wharf or pier must lie within
the projected boundaries of the riparian owner's waterfront prop-
erty.275
When the lake or stream is considered non-navigable, it can be
privately owned. 6 In this case, neither the public nor the owner of
adjacent lands (whose title only extends to the margin of the lake)
enjoys the right to navigate or fish on the waters. 7 Finally, owner-
ship of the land under non-navigable marshes carries with it
exclusive hunting and fishing rights.
2 78
As proprietor of navigable waters in Ohio, the State is required
to hold such waters available for public use, and is the trustee of
the fish and wildlife within those waters. In State v. City of Bowling
Green, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the city liable for the neg-
ligent operation of its sewage treatment plant, resulting in the
discharge of pollutants that killed fish in the Portage River. In ad-
dition to the duties imposed upon the State (presently the Ohio
Department of Natural Resources), "an essential part of a trust
doctrine" is the State's affirmative duty to take action against the
negligent acts of others that destroy property held in trust (e.g.,
fish) .28
G. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania developed its public trust jurisprudence based on
its experience with the rivers and lakes in the eastern part of the
State, rather than its experience with Lake Erie.8 2 Besides a few
idiosyncrasies, application of the public trust doctrine in Pennsyl-
274. Walaer, 16 Ohio at 544.
275. Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
276. E. Bay Sporting Club, 161 N.E. at 16.
277. Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 690 (Ohio 1890).
278. E. Bay Sporting Club, 161 N.E. at 13.
279. State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974); see also OHIO REV.
COnE ANN. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001); 35A AM. JUR. 2D Fish, Game and Wildlfe Conservation
§ 1 (2006) (noting that ownership or tide to fish and game is generally held by the State in
trust for the benefit of its citizens).
280. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d at 409.
281. Id. at 411. The authors found no similar case law in the other seven Great Lakes
states that addresses the affirmative duty to take action against negligent acts that destroy
property held in trust (e.g., fish or wildlife). See Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, The
Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35
ENVTL. L. 673, 693-720 (2005).
282. Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 108 Pa. 607, 613 (1885).
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vania is straightforward. Pennsylvania cases do not specifically
mention the public trust's application to the Great Lakes, however,
under federal case law, it appears that the beds of the Great Lakes
passed to the State in trust for the public.83
A Commonwealth Act of March 21, 179884 declared certain bodies
of water to be public streams and highways for the passage of boats
and rafts.285 These waterways also pass the more general common law
test of navigability that applies to all waters within the State.286 In
Pennsylvania, courts use the following test for navigability:
[It depends upon whether the water] is used or useable as a
broad highroad for commerce and the transport in quantity
of goods and people, which is the rule naturally applicable to
rivers and to large lakes, or whether all of the mentioned fac-
tors counted in the water remains a local focus of attraction,
which is the rule sensibly applicable to shallow streams and to
small lakes and ponds. The basic difference is that between a
trade-route and a point of interest. The first is a public use
and the second private.287
If a lake or river is considered navigable, then the riparian
owner only takes to the low-water mark, subject to the public's
right of navigation, fishing, and other proper uses up to the high-
water mark (especially when the water level is high).288 If the lake
or river is considered non-navigable, then the riparian owner gen-
erally takes to the middle of the waterway.285 In Pennsylvania
riparian rights are subject to the same disposition as other property
interests. 290 Thus, a riparian owner may convey them, reserve them,
or sever them from the upland property interests. 291 The grantor's
intention determines the property interests that change hands.
292
In a case where the owner grants the uplands independently of any
283. Id.; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
284. 3 LAws OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 1700-1810 320 (John Bioren
1810) (republished in 4 volumes under the authority of the legislature with notes and refer-
ences by Bioren).
285. Id.
286. Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486, 489 (Pa. 1959).
287. Id.
288. Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869).
289. Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909).
290. Gibbs v. Sweet, 20 Pa. Super. 275, 282 (Super. Ct. 1902).
291. Id. at 282-83.
292. Mountain Props., Inc. v. Tyler Hill Realty Corp., 767 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2001).
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riparian rights, mere ownership of land bordering the water gives
no ownership right of the waterway.293
Pennsylvania applies the common law rule that ownership of a
part of a lakebed includes ownership of the water above it.2 94 So, in
the case of non-navigable waterways where the riparian owner has
retained her interest in the bottomland, she may prevent others
from using the waters above her property.290 This means that the
owner of a portion of a non-navigable waterway has the right to use
only the part of the lake or river immediately above her submerged
land, and not the entire body of water.296 Thus, in the case of a non-
navigable pond or lake where the submerged land is owned by
others and no riparian rights attach to the property bordering the
water, the adjacent landowner becomes a trespasser when he at-
tempts to use the pond or lake.297
Finally, the Act of April 11, 1848 explicitly authorizes the State
to grant the right to mine not more than 100 acres of the bed of
any navigable river at or below the low-water mark.2 9 Such a grant
only gives the right to dig and mine for minerals; it provides no
title to the actual soil, sand, or anything else in the riverbed. 30 0 As
mentioned above, the riparian owner has the right in the soil to
the ordinary low-water mark of the river, subject to the public right
of navigation, fishing, and other proper use of the highway to the
ordinary high-water mark. 0' It appears that there is no reported
case law in Pennsylvania that has considered how the conveyance
of mining rights in a navigable river affects the public's right of
navigation and fishing.
H. Wisconsin
Of all the Great Lakes states, Wisconsin's public trust doctrine is
the most expansive in scope. Wisconsin's law 1) applies to a broad
number of public uses of waterways, 2) includes protections for
natural resources (e.g., wetlands0 2) and the environment, and 3)
293. Matthews v. Bagnik, 41 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945).
294. Mountain Props., 767 A.2d at 1100.
295. Smoulter v. Boyd, 58 A. 144, 152 (Pa. 1904).
296. Id.; Mountain Props., 767 A.2d at 1100.
297. Matthews, 41 A.2d at 877-88.
298. An Act to encourage the further development of the mineral resources of the
commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1848 Pa. Laws 533.
299. Pa. Coal Co. v. Winchester, 109 Pa. 572, 576 (1885).
300. Id.
301. Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869).
302. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 765-66 (Wis. 1972).
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even extends to preservation of trust lands and waters so as to pre-
serve their scenic beauty. 113 The public trust duty requires the State
not only to protect the public's right of navigation, but also to pre-
serve the navigable waters for fishing, hunting, recreation, and
scenic beauty.3 4 This includes the duty to eradicate present pollu-
tion and to prevent further pollution in navigable waters.05
Wisconsin has held that the historic common law definition of
navigability is unimportant.3 0 6 At one time, the question of naviga-
bility for purposes of the public trust was answered by local law.07
Since the public trust was codified by statute in 1989, the Wiscon-
sin Department of Natural Resources has administered the trust
with reference to the State definition of navigability.08 Accordingly,
all lakes that are located within or partially within Wisconsin are
navigable, and therefore public waters, if they are navigable-in-
fact.309 Navigable-in-fact is defined as water "capable of floating any
boat, skiff or canoe, of the shallowest draft used for recreational
purposes., 310 In adopting such a test, Wisconsin has refused to limit
public trust protections to those waters only useful for commercial
purposes."' The trust also applies to certain artificial waters con-
nected to non-navigable waters and, in some instances, to non-
navigable streams that impact navigable waters.3 1 3 A waterway need
not be navigable at all times of the year; instead, it only has to be
navigable at some regularly recurring interval.314 Furthermore, an
area need not be actually navigable to receive public trust protec-
tion; being part of a navigable waterway is sufficient.
31 5
The title to the beds of all lakes and ponds that fall under the
above definition of navigability, including the Great Lakes, is vested
in the State up to the high-water mark.3 1 6 The ordinary high-water
mark is defined as "the point on the bank or shore up to which the
303. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 521 (Wis. 1952).
304. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Wis.
1978).
305. Id. at 76.
306. Ne-pee-nauk Club v. Wilson, 71 N.W. 661,661-662 (Wis. 1897).
307. Id.
308. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.097 (West 2004).
309. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Wis. 1952).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 412 N.W.2d 505, 510
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
313. Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Wis. 1974); Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 519.
314. DeGayner & Co. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 236 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Wis. 1875).
315. State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Wis. 1987).
316. Id. at 343.
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presence and action of the water is so continuous as to leave a dis-
tinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation,
or other easily recognized characteristic." 1 7 The trust doctrine
prohibits the State from granting substantial quantities of bottom-
land to private persons, but it does not prevent minor alterations
in the shoreline of a navigable body of water.3m8 A bed of a lake may
be filled in instances where all or some of the following are true: 1)
the filled area is open to the public; 2) public bodies control the
use of the area; 3) the filled area and diminished capacity of the
lake, because of the fill, is relatively small compared to the whole
lake; 4) the benefit to the public who will use the filled area greatly
outweighs the negative impact to the members of the public who
use the part of the lake to be filled; and 5) a public body controls
the use of the filled area.319
The title of a riparian owner along a stream or river, either navi-
gable or non-navigable, extends to the center of the stream or
river.20 On navigable streams, this title is subject to the public's
right to navigate, hunt, fish, and recreate up to the high-water
mark.32' On non-navigable streams, the riparian owner's rights are
absolute.3 -
A riparian owner may construct a wharf or pier on a navigable
waterway past the high-water mark in order to aid navigation, as
long as the wharf or pier does not interfere with the rights of other
riparian owners or the public's rights: Riparian owners may not
expand their property by building out into the lake for that pur-
pose, but natural accretions belong to the riparian owners. 24 In
Wisconsin, no riparian owner may convey away any exclusively ri-
parian right, except the right to access the water by crossing over
the uplands.2 5 A patent cannot be given for land that is covered by
navigable water, and any such patent is void.3 6
317. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914).
318. State v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 72 (Wis. 1957).
319. Id. at 73.
320. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514,517 (Wis. 1952).
321. Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273, 275 (Wis. 1898).
322. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 740 F.
Supp. 1400, 1424 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
323. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.13 (West 2006).
324. Doemel v.Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 396 (Wis. 1923).
325. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.133 (West 2006).
326. See Doemel, 193 N.W. at 395.
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Ill. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TEST To AID IN IMPLEMENTING THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE GREAT LAKES STATES
Our historical survey of the public trust doctrine in waterways of
the Great Lake states reveals considerable variety in how these
states have approached and implemented the doctrine. We build
on some of these approaches in crafting a new model for imple-
menting the trust.
We propose three levels of analysis for determining how the
public trust doctrine applies in a Great Lakes state. The first level
addresses the geographic scope of the doctrine's applicability in
waterways. The second level addresses public rights of access to wa-
terways. The third level addresses the uses of the waterways that
should be protected and how impairments of those uses should be
handled.
A. The First Level: Geographic Scope
First, we believe that the geographical scope of the trust doctrine
in the Great Lakes system should still generally depend on a de-
termination of whether the waterway in question is in some way
"navigable. 327 But, unlike the federal navigable-in-fact test 32 " and
the navigable-for-commercial-purpose test applied in Illinois, 3 9 the
definition of "navigability" should be broader for the purpose of
327. The term "navigability" has many meanings depending on the purpose for which
the test is used. It determines not only the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, for
example, United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1953), but also
the scope of federal power to regulate navigation, for example, Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 587 (1963). Pre-emptive federal authority over navigation, derived from the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution, enables the federal government to regulate the flow of
navigable rivers and streams. Id. At one time the term was understood in a more restricted
sense, as subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469, 477 (1988); supra note 86 (discussing the meaning of navigability under Eng-
lish law). As this Article demonstrates, there are also a number of state navigability tests not
only for determining title boundaries but also for applying the public trust doctrine.
328. To determine "navigability" for the purpose of defining the title to freshwaters that
a state received from the United States upon statehood, the federal navigability-in-fact test
applies. E.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324,
336 (1876). The federal navigability-for-title test has seven elements: 1) navigability is a ques-
tion of fact; 2) a waterway must be susceptible to navigation; 3) the waterway must be
susceptible to navigation as a highway for public passage; 4) a waterway must be navigable in
its natural and ordinary condition; 5) navigability is established at the time of statehood; 6)
navigability need not be continuous; and 7) navigability may be based on the capacity to
support relatively small craft. E.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971).
329. E.g., 70 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 1820/27 (West 2005); DuPont v. Miller, 141 N.E.
423, 425 (111. 923); Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 784 (Ill. 1905).
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applying the public trust doctrine in the Great Lakes system. Bor-
rowing from Wisconsin's broad definition of navigability,330 the test
for the Great Lakes system should be based on whether a stream or
lake is capable of floating a recreational boat of the shallowest
draft at a specified time of the year. The trust would apply to cer-
tain artificial waters connected to navigable waters, 33' and in some
instances to non-navigable streams that impact navigable waters.
It would also apply to artificial waterways that were once non-
navigable but have become navigable over time. At this level, the
test for navigability would not require any balancing of the public's
rights of access, public uses, private uses, or public or private bene-
fits; nor would it require a public purpose.
A number of reasons support a broad definition of navigability
for the Great Lakes system. First, the term is as old as the country.
The concept of navigability is grounded in the "forever free" guar-
antee of the Northwest Ordinance 334 and the statehood acts of six
of the Great Lakes states; namely, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Secondly, a broad definition is
336consistent with the test used in Illinois Central Railroad, the water-
shed public trust case dealing with Chicago's Lake Michigan
shoreline and navigable waters. Finally, a broad test is of particular
importance for the Great Lakes system, which forms a unique
"world heritage" freshwater ecosystem that is especially sensitive to
degradation by a wide range of pollutants, invasive species, and
competing public and private uses.337 Viewing the Great Lakes
more in ecological terms-by emphasizing the reach of the Great
Lakes system's biota up its many tributaries and the importance of
headwaters habitat to the biota-further justifies an expanded
geographic scope of the public trust doctrine in the tributaries that
feed the Great Lakes.338
330. Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Wis. 1974); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Wis. 1952); Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res.,
412 N.W.2d 505,510 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
331. Village of Menomonee Falls, 412 N.W.2d at 510.
332. Omernik, 218 N.W.2d at 739.
333. Id.
334. See supra note 94.
335. See Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 456-59.
336. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
337. See GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 4-5, 14-15, 29-35.
338. Id. at 14-15, 42.
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B. The Second Level: Public Rights of Access
Expansion of the geographical scope of the doctrine, would not
necessarily mean that a particular public right of access would be
commensurately expanded. In keeping with the trust's purpose, it
is appropriate to limit some rights of public access to certain por-
tions of the waterway. Time limitations are also appropriate, based
on a season or a hunting season. Natural seasonal variations in
temperature also impact when and under what circumstances ac-
cess should be allowed. Some rights of access would be allowed
only on weekends, others only during the week, and still others
only once a year. Although the courts have traditionally protected
the rights of public access for navigation (i.e., passage), commerce,
and fishing, they have never suggested a hierarchy for such rights
339or provided a test to resolve conflicts that may arise.
In many instances, questions about the appropriateness of a par-
ticular access right inextricably involve questions about the
appropriateness of a particular use. For example, near some public
swimming beaches, access points for kayaks, canoes, and wind surf-
ing might be appropriate, but due to safety concerns, access slips
for large sailboats and motorboats would be inappropriate, and
access for commercial fishing (e.g., a marina) and transportation
(e.g., a terminal) would be wholly inappropriate.
Other questions arise. For example, away from swimming
beaches, should access for fishing be favored over access for pas-
sage? Should access for navigation (e.g., a terminal for a ferry
boat) be favored over access for fishing (e.g., a boat ramp for a bass
boat)? Too much boat traffic may scare fish away. But too much
access to one area by commercial and recreational fishermen may
result in a crash in the fishing industry, conflicts among commer-
cial fishermen, or conflicts between recreational and commercial
fishermen. Such conflicts have already occurred in the Great Lakes
between subsistence Native American fishermen and recreational
340fishermen, with a history of violent results in some areas.
Boaters may also disturb bottom sediments where fish eggs
hatch, resulting in a decline in the number of fish. Boating may
cause the banks of small streams to erode and cover the gravel on
the bottom with silt or sand. The size and composition of native
gravel is essential for the adherence of fish eggs. Eggs that do not
adhere wash away downstream to be eaten or to rot. How to
339. See discussion supra note 54.
340. See Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 54, at 335-39, 369-71.
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remove sand from gravel spawning grounds on the upper reaches
of the river, and how to keep the sand from returning to the bot-
tom, is a particular challenge for the Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians in Michigan, who are trying to restore and maintain a
naturally reproducing population of lake sturgeon in the Little
River.
341
Other conflicts arise between recreational river users and ripar-
ian owners.342 Although the trust doctrine is designed to provide
public access to navigable waters for a variety of uses, it does not
guarantee the public's right to use the banks of a navigable
stream. 43 In many states public rights extend only to the water's
edge and walking on the shoreland constitutes a trespass,344 but in
some states walking on the same area when the water is up to the
high-water mark is permitted (i.e., wet feet are okay) .3 ' In a few
states the public has a right to use the exposed shore area along
navigable streams and rivers, without the permission of the ripar-
ian owner, when engaged in water-related recreational activity.14
6
Those activities are limited to activities that require water, such as
fishing, swimming, and boating, and this rule does not apply to
lakes, ditches, channels, or other bodies of water that are not char-
acterized by flowing water. "7 In some waterways there may be a
"right to float on by, 3 48 which may expand and contract depending
on the water level, but that does not include a right to infringe on
349the rights of the shore owner.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we suggest that the second level
of inquiry should be ajudicial one, with some discretion left to the
trustee. The court or trustee would: 1) determine whether the par-
ticular right of access is suitable for the entire geographic area
defined as public under the first inquiry, or portions thereof; 2)
341. From the personal experience of author Bertram C. Frey as a guest of the Little
River Band of Ottawa Indians. This footnote applies to this entire paragraph.
342. Dustin Trowbridge Till, Comment, The Right To Float on By: Why the Washington Leg-
islature Should Expand Recreational Access to Washington's Rivers and Streams, 28 U. SEaTrL L.
Rav. 1093, 1093-94 (2005).
343. See Doemel v.Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 397 (Wis. 1923).
344. E.g., Gianoli v. Pfleiderer, 563 N.W.2d 562, 571-72 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). In Gianoli,
the court held that a riparian owner could properly exclude the public from the area be-
tween the ordinary high- and low-water marks, particularly when doing so would not
interfere with the public's right of navigation. Id. at 572.
345. E.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 71 (Mich. 2005). In low-water mark states,
the right of access is only for navigation and fishing when the water is high; it is still a tres-
pass to walk on the submerged land. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80, 86 (1876).
346. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.134 (West 2006).
347. Id.
348. See Till, supra note 342, at 1093-94.
349. See KENT & DUDIAK, supra note 53, at 12-13.
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determine during what time periods and under what circum-
stances the right of access may be exercised; 3) determine whether
the right of access would promote the sustainability of the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the waterway;5 0 and finally
4) resolve disputes, if any, between or among competing or con-
flicting rights of access.
The proposed test presents some obvious issues. First, how
would a court or trustee determine whether a right of access is
suitable or unsuitable for a stream or lake? By the term "suitable"
we mean "adapted to use or purpose." This inquiry would require
examining the geographic scope, time, and circumstances for ac-
cess, as well as the environmental impacts of access. Second, the
term "sustainability" includes the concepts of not only nourishing
and prolonging the life of waterways but also "sustainable devel-
opment." Rights of access should support sustainable use practices
that protect environmental resources while enhancing the recrea-
tional and commercial value of the Great La . 35 f1ti nl ad m c  e e Lakes. If a right o
access does not support such use practices, it should not be al-
lowed. Third, we envision that it would be the trustee-usually an
employee of a state natural resources agency rather than an em-
ployee of the state environmental protection agency-who would
most often employ the test in determining whether to grant access
permits. 3 52 Unless the administrative agency abused its discretion in
applying the test, the courts would generally defer to the agency.353
If the abuse was substantial a higher standard of review would be
S 354
appropriate.
C. The Third Level: Protected Uses, and Other
Important Considerations
Questions concerning public rights of access invariably raise the
question of "access for what purpose or what use"? Just as there are
limitations on public access to navigable waters, there are also
350. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1258, 1268 (2006); GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS,
supra note 5, at 4-5, 14-15, 29-35.
351. See GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 4-5, 14-15, 29-35;
GREAT LAKES INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 9.
352. See KENT & DUDIAK, supra note 53, at 1-36.
353. See, e.g., State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 412-13 (Wis. 1974); Just v. Marinette
County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 146 N.W.2d 577,
582-83 (Wis. 1966); Scanlan, supra note 83, at 320.
354. Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in Wild-
life, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 57 (2000).
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limitations on the use of streams, lakes, their beds, and their living
contents.3 5 5 In analyzing whether a public use should be protected,
we suggest that the courts evaluate: 1) whether the waterway is suit-
able for use by a group of people having a common3 56 beneficial
interest in it; 2) whether the use is reasonable and for a proper
public purpose; 35 '7 3) whether the state has complied with its special
obligation to maintain the trust;3 8 4) whether the use, by itself, or
in combination with other recognized uses, promotes the sustain-
ability of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
waterway; and 5) whether the use would unduly impact the rights
359of private landowners, including riparian owners.
Again, we envision a court applying the test, with a state natural
resources trustee having discretion to decide how a use should be
protected. In particular, the trustee would use the test to adminis-
ter the trust and evaluate whether to grant a variety of permits.3,°
Unless the administrative agency abused its discretion in applying
the test, the court would generally defer to the agency;.6' however,
if there was a substantial breach of trust, a more stringent standard
of review would be applied.362
There are a number of other important considerations. In ap-
plying each of the three levels, but especially in administering the
355. See KENT & DUDIAK, supra note 53, at 13. Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin have
recognized recreational fishing and boating as public rights protected by the trust doctrine.
Petraborg v. Zontelli, 15 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn. 1944); Nelson v. De Long, 7 N.W.2d 342,
346 (Minn. 1942); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 373,
374 (Ohio 1959); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72
(Wis. 1978). Both Minnesota and Wisconsin recognize recreational swimming as a protected
public right in navigable lakes. Petraborg, 15 N.W.2d at 180; Nelson, 7 N.W.2d at 346; State v.
Beck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 499-500 (Wis. 1983); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 271 N.W.2d at 72.
Minnesota has protected ice cutting on public lakes. Petraborg, 15 N.W.2d at 180; Nelson, 7
N.W.2d at 346. Since the advent of modern refrigeration, however, this right has diminished
in importance.
356. See discussion supra note 84.
357. Wisconsin courts, for example, play an important role in determining whether the
public trust is being administered for the public's benefit. See State v. Kenosha County Bd. of
Adjustment, 577 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Wis. 1998).
358. Sax, supra note 61, at 511; cf Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459-60 (1892)
(recognizing judicial responsibility to examine legislative authority not only for its general
conformity to the scope of regulatory power, but also for its consonance with the state's
special obligation to maintain the public trust in Great Lakes waters).
359. Similar to our factor analysis test for determining whether particular uses should
be protected, the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted a factor-weighing test for determining
whether a watercourse is navigable. Mentor Harbor Yachting Club, 163 N.E.2d at 375.
360. See KENT & DUDIAK, supra note 53, at 1-36.
361. See, e.g., State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 412-13 (Wis. 1974); Just v. Marinette
County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 146 N.W.2d 577, 583
(Wis. 1966); Scanlan, supra note 83, at 320.
362. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); see Homer, supra note
354, at 57.
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third level, the position of trustee carries great weight. The person
holding the position should be an expert in the field, competent,
independent, and insulated from undue political pressure. 36' His
decision-making should be highly visible and transparent.164 The
beneficiaries of the trust (i.e., the group of users with a common
beneficial interest in the waterway) should have standing to sue
and a legal right of action against a trustee whose actions fail toS 365
meet trust standards. In particular, a beneficiary should have the
right to: 1) compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee, 2)
enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust, 3) compel
the trustee to redress a breach of the trust, 4) appoint a receiver to
take possession of the trust property and administer the trust
properly, and 5) remove the trustee and request a court to appoint
a new trustee.366 Finally, as in applying the test at the second level,
the trustee's actions should be judged using a high standard of
care and loyalty when substantial breaches of fiduciary duty are
involved.
Using the applicable tests at the third level would allow a court
(or trustee) to recognize a broader range of public uses and rights.
For instance, our approach would acknowledge the importance of
recreational uses, which now have greater commercial value in the
Great Lakes366 than traditional commercial uses, such as navigation
for passage,3 69 floating saw logs to market,' 0 and commercial fish-
ing.371 In addition, the courts could more easily recognize the
public's right to preserve trust lands and waters so as to protect
their scenic beauty.3 72 Applying the broader navigability test at level
one together with the sustainability tests at levels two and three
would also allow a court to impose restrictions that would prevent
environmental harm and preserve lands and waters subject to the
public trust.373 For some protected environmental concerns, it
would be appropriate to extend public protections into portions of
363. See Horner, supra note 354, at 41-49.
364. Id. at 49-54.
365. See id. at 54-57.
366. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt.(a) at 214 (1959); see Homer, supra
note 354, at 54-56.
367. See Horner, supra note 354, at 57.
368. GLRC STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 9.
369. E.g., DuPont v. Miller, 141 N.E. 423, 423 (Ill. 1923); Smith v. Odell, 137 N.E. 325,
326-27 (N.Y. 1922); Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486, 489 (Pa. 1959).
370. E.g., Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550, 553 (8th
Cir. 1931); Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Mich. 1982).
371. E.g., Freeland v. Pa. R.R., 47 A. 745, 746 (Pa. 1901).
372. See supra note 83 and infra chart XIII in Appendix B.
373. See supra note 82 and infra chart XII in Appendix B.
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non-navigable waters, but this has so far occurred (with few excep-
tions) only in tidal non-navigable waters. 4 It would also be
appropriate to substantially restrict some commercial and naviga-
tion uses because they would not be suitable for a particular
waterway in view of their unreasonable impact on the physical
structure and ecological health of the waterway, and because they
harm the rights of private landowners.
The proposed sustainability tests at levels two and three would
allow a court to impose remedies for impairment of a beneficial
use or impairments caused by cumulative adverse impacts of uses
(or misuses). Cases employing the traditional, state "navigability"
test do not provide such broad protection.' 6 Following Annex 2 of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, as amended by a
protocol signed November 18, 1987, 77 the test could protect
against impairment of a number of beneficial uses. This would in-
clude any significant change in the chemical, physical, or
biological integrity of the Great Lakes system that was sufficient to
cause: 1) restrictions on fish and wildlife consumption; 2) tainting
of fish and wildlife flavor; 3) degradation of fish and wildlife popu-
lations; 4) fish tumors or other deformities; 5) bird or animal
deformities or reproductive problems; 6) degradation of phyto-
plankton and zooplankton populations in waterways; 7) loss of fish
and wildlife habitat; 8) degradation of benthos; 9) restrictions on
dredging activities; 10) eutrophication or undesirable algae; 11)
restrictions on drinking water consumption, or taste or odor prob-
lems; 12) beach closings; 13) added costs to agriculture or industry
(e.g., from damages to water intakes caused by incrustations of ze-
bra mussels, an invasive Eurasian species); or 14) degradation of
aesthetics.
378
The five-step test at level three would allow the courts and/or
the legislatures of the Great Lakes states to provide public trust
protections against impairment of a number of beneficial uses, in-
cluding significant changes that affect fish and wildlife (numbers
374. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1988) (stating that the
public trust extends to all non-navigable waters that are influenced by the ebb and flow of
the tide); see also Austin, supra note 30, at 1003-06; cf. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal. 1983) (holding that public trust extends to any non-navigable
waterway that significantly affects the public's interest in a larger navigable body). This is
important because the recognized public uses of swimming, ice cutting, and skating often
occur in water so shallow it does not meet most states' navigability tests.
375. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.32501 to .32516 (West Supp. 2006); Bott, 327
N.W.2d at 842 (discussing policy concerns).
376. See supra note 62.
377. GLWQA, supranote 16, at annex 2, 1.(a), (c).
378. Id. at annex 2, pt. l(c).
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one through seven above) . Protecting against these impairments
would also be viewed as incident to fishing rights, and hunting
rights where hunting is a recognized public use. The suggested
five-step test for determining protected uses would protect against
impairments of other beneficial uses, including significant changes
that affect the use or condition of waterways and their submerged
lands (numbers eight through thirteen above)."8 The proposed
test would also support existing scenic beauty protections afforded
to trust lands and waters by Wisconsin case law,"" by Indiana382 and
Michigan statutes, s3 and by constitutional amendment in Pennsyl-• 384
vania, as well as extending such protections to other Great Lakes
states.
Going beyond scenic beauty protections and the enumerated
impairments of use covered by the Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment,
385 the proposed test would protect against impairments of
additional beneficial uses, including any significant change in the
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the Great Lakes system
sufficient to cause: 1) impairment of use of trust property caused
by exotic invasive species, or 2) degradation of the quality of near-
coastal waters (e.g., from a spill of oil or other hazardous sub-
stances), which would include impairment of uses of private
upland and riparian property.
The proposal here at level three does not go so far as to give
precedence to public trust rights in ecological resources over pri-
vate rights.3 6 Step five of the test weighs whether the use would
unduly impact the rights of private property owners, including ri-
parian owners. Under this step, courts and trustees must protect
379. Id.; see cases cited and discussion supra note 62.
380. GLWQA, supra note 16, at annex 2, pt. 1 (c).
381. State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987); City of Madison v. State, 83
N.W.2d 674, 678 (Wis. 1957); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 522 (Wis.
1952). Another Wisconsin case states that the public has a right to enjoy scenic beauty as
one of the "incidents of navigation." City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 97 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis.
1959).
382. Indiana statutory law provides that the "natural resources and the natural scenic
beauty of Indiana are a public right," IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-5(c) (West 1998), and that
the State holds and controls public freshwater lakes and natural, scenic, and recreational
river systems in trust for all citizens of Indiana. Id. at §§ 14-26-2-5, 14-29-6-7.
383. In granting permits for proposed structures or projects impacting inland lakes and
streams, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources must consider, among other mat-
ters under the trust doctrine, whether the structure or project would "unlawfully impair or
destroy" the aesthetics of the inland lake or stream. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.30106
(West 1999); see§ 324.1704.
384. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 27. See supra note 115.
385. GLWQA, supra note 16, at annex 2, 1.(a), (c).
386. See supra note 62.
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private property rights against excessive infringement from public
uses of waterways.
Several commentators3"" have also supported expansion of the
public trust doctrine to better protect the environment. The public
trust doctrine in California, Louisiana,389 Michigan, 390 and Wis• 391
consin supports an expansionist application of the public trust
doctrine to include protection of waterways, the land thereunder,
and their living contents in their natural state. These states provide
expanded protections so that the trust area may serve as an ecologi-
cal unit for scientific study, as open space, and as an environment
that provides food and habitat for birds and marine life and that
favorably affects the scenery and climate of the system.392
Because of the unique and environmentally vulnerable nature of
the Great Lakes freshwater system, as well as its vast and irreplace-
able ecological and economic value, we believe that the Great
Lakes states should expand protections under state public trust
laws. State law protections should be commensurate with (but not
the same as) the environmental protections afforded to the Great
Lakes system collectively under the federal Clean Water Act, 94 Clean
Air Act,395 the Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and
Canada,396 the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement,397 and the Great
387. E.g., Austin, supra note 30, at 1009-19; Frank, supra note 58, at 624-29; Quick, su-
pra note 62, at 117-22; Sax, supra note 61, at 485-89, 556-65; Frey, supra note 107, at 244-46.
388. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719-20 (Cal. 1983); State v.
Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 251 (Cal. 1981); State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 256, 260
(Cal. 1981); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
389. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984). The
Save Ourselves case held that the State's proper role as trustee includes an affirmative duty to
act on the public's behalf. Id. at 1157. The case also held that Louisiana's environmental
"regulatory framework is . .. based on state constitutional provisions and the public trust
concept." Id. at 1158; accord In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000),
where the court found that the state's water commission was bound by an "affirmative duty
to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and
to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." Id. at 453. By this the court meant that "any
balancing between public and private purposes begin with a presumption in favor of public
use, access, and enjoyment." Id. at 454.
390. See supra note 66.
391. See State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 577 N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Wis.
1998); Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Wis. 1974); Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Wis.
1952); Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 412 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1987).
392. See cases cited supra notes 66, 388, 389, 390.
393. See authorities cited supra note 5.
394. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1258, 1268 (2006).
395. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006).
396. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-U.K.,Jan. 11, 1909, 36 STAT. 2448.
397. GLWQA, supra note 16.
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Lakes Air Quality Agreement. " Our analysis focuses on preserving
public uses of the waters and subaqueous lands of the Great Lakes
system and their living contents and protecting against impairment
of those areas and uses. This analysis is based more on natural sci-
ence than economics, but it does not discount economic analysis
or the importance of private property rights.
The sustainability of natural ecosystems on Earth has been
viewed as so vital a concern, and so important a value to the people
who depend on a particular ecosystem for their own health and
welfare as well that of their future generations, that societies
around the world have rejected both wholesale private acquisition
of significant portions and unfettered public use of the ecosys-
tem9 In particular, many countries-including Italy, China, Spain,
several Moslem countries, Nigeria, and the United States4 °--have
ancient traditions and modern legal rules that give special treat-
ment to major bodies of water.4 0 ' These rules have attempted to
preserve the bulk of commonly used waterways and their living
contents for sustainable common use, while permitting modest in-
dividual uses and appropriation of the living contents that are
compatible with preserving and renewing the whole corpus for cur-
rent as well as future users. °2 If ever there were a major water
system that is worthy of such sustainable use and preservation, it is
the Great Lakes system.
In the Great Lakes, pollution clearly impacts a state trustee's
ability to protect traditional uses (e.g., commercial fishing) and
many recreational uses as well as its ability to preserve a waterway's
natural state and scenic beauty.40 3 Unlike pollution from rivers that
run to the oceans, all pathways of pollution in the Great Lakes ba-
sin end in the lakes.04 Regardless of whether pollutants are diluted
by large stream flows or temporarily stored in sediment particles
on stream bottoms, they will eventually reach the lakes and add to
the total pollution burden.0 5 Because the system is almost closed
398. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, T.I.A.S. No. 11783.
399. SeeWilkinson, supra note 46, at 430.
400. Id. at 429. The same author notes the complexity of the doctrine as applied in the
United States. Id. at 430-39. He observes that there are fifty-one public trust doctrines, one
federal and one in each of the fifty states. Id. As discussed above, one of the purposes of this
Article has been to explore some of the complexity of the doctrine's application in the eight
Great Lake states.
401. Id. at 428-29.
402. See Rose, supra note 62, at 351.
403. SeeGREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAs, supra note 5, at 4-5, 14-15, 29-39.
404. Id. at 32.
405. Id.
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geographically4 0 6 (with only one natural outlet from the rest of the
lakes at Niagara Falls to Lake Ontario), the lakes respond to total
quantities of persistent toxic pollutants, as well as to localized con-
centrations of those pollutants and others, such as biological
pathogens from sewage and oxygen-depleting pollutants.4° It is
thus imperative to understand the total loadings of pollutants to
each lake from all pathways. 8 Air pollution, which enters the Great
Lakes from within basin sources and from long-range transport,
deposits substantial amounts of pollutants, including persistent
toxic contaminants.4 0 9 A number of these persistent toxicants bio-
accumulate as they pass to living things through the food chain. 0
Concentrations of these persistent toxicants become biologically
magnified millions of times in top predators at the end of a long
food chain, such as lake trout and fish-eating birds and people.4 "
The documented harmful effects of these pollutants include hu-
man babies with low birth weight; increased risk of cancer, birth
defects, and genetic mutations in people; egg-shell thinning in
birds; crossed billed cormorants; cancerous tumors in fish and
birds; wasting disease in fish and birds; and other adverse impacts
on the immune system, nervous system, pre-natal and post-natal
development, and fertility of fish and birds. 2
Exotic-that is, non-native-invasive species of animals and
plants have also had a detrimental impact on the Great Lakes sys-
tem.4 1 3 In the lakes, sea lamprey, carp, smelt, alewife, Pacific
salmon, zebra mussels, and brown gouby, to name just a few, have
had highly visible and costly impacts.4 4 Keeping the Asian carp and
the snakehead fish out of the Great Lakes system also deserves a
high priority.4 1 5 The effects of hundreds of other invading species
may be less obvious but can be profound. 6 On land, invading ex-
otics such as purple loosestrife, garlic mustard, and many varieties
406. Id. at 3-4, 32-34. Outflows from the Great Lakes are relatively small (less than one
percent per year) in comparison to the total volume of water. Retention times for the vol-
ume of water in each lake have been estimated as follows, in descending order: Superior,
191 years; Michigan, 99 years; Huron, 22 years; Ontario, 6 years; and Erie, 2.6 years. The
volume of Lake Superior exceeds the combined volumes of the other four lakes. Id. at 3-4.
407. Id. at 29-32.
408. Id. at 31-32.
409. Id. at 30-32, 37-39.
410. Id. at 14-15, 30-33.
411. Id. at 14-15, 33.
412. Id. at 4-5, 30-31, 33-35.
413. Id. at 35.
414. Id.
415. GREAT LAKES INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 60, at 15-19.
416. GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 35.
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of European buckthorn continue to displace native species.47 The
collective result has meant disruption, and in some cases destruc-
tion, of the complex aquatic and terrestrial communities of plants
and animals in the Great Lakes system.18
For all of the foregoing reasons-particularly because the Great
Lakes are a geographically closed, fresh water system that is highly
sensitive to and impacted by a variety of persistent, bio-
accumulative toxicants and invasive species-we urge expansion of
the public trust doctrine in the waterways of the eight Great Lakes
states.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN EXPANSIVE APPLICATION OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE
While we have presented a case for an expansive reading of the
public trust doctrine, significant debate exists about the nature of
the doctrine and whether it is compatible with private property
rights at all.419 Some commentators emphasize that the doctrine has
gone too far and eroded private rights in waterways and lands ad-
jacent to them.4"' These private riparian and littoral rights derive
from English common law and are enjoyed by owners of land ad-
joining navigable waters, including both tidal and non-tidal waters,
as well as non-navigable waters that are "influenced by the ebb and
flow of the tide.""2 Commentators who espouse these views note
that, in the United States, fundamental notions of private property
and the dominion over nature rely on private ownership, control,
417. Id.
418. Id. One report estimated that the economy of the Great Lakes loses approximately
$5 billion per year as a result of exotic invasive species. GLRC STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 17.
419. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public
Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform,
44 VAND. L. REV. 1209 (1991);James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine
in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 534, 561-65, 571-72 (1986).
420. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHi. L. REV. 799 (2004); sources
cited supra note 419.
421. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1988); see also COASTAL
STATES ORG., supra note 72, at 289-96 and cases cited at 297-306. "Strictly speaking, the
rights of an owner whose land abuts tidewaters are called 'littoral rights,' and whose land
abuts navigable rivers[, streams,] and lakes are called 'riparian rights."' Id.; cf Glass v.
Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 61 n.1 (Mich. 2005) (noting that, because the common law of the
seas applies to the Great Lakes, the court will extend the term "littoral," which more com-
monly applies to seas and their coasts, to shoreland of the Great Lakes).
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and development of land and resources." They emphasize that
our entire society is premised on conceptions of private property,
423
including the singular importance of the right to exclude others.4 4
"For those who view private property as the bulwark of the free en-
terprise system and constitutional liberty, the [public trust]
doctrine looms as a vague threat."425 At least one author believes
that much of recent public trust law infringes on vested private
426property rights and therefore violates the federal Constitution.
One example that illustrates this tension between private rights
and the public trust arises from wetlands development.427 Develop-
ers analyze this issue in economic terms, focusing on the economic
burdens of regulation and the diminution in value of private de-
velopment rights caused by the public's exercise of public trust
beneficial uses.428 Although the extent of the public trust doctrine
was not at issue in the recent Supreme Court case of Rapanos v.
United States, the case addressed the question of what should be the
proper scope of federal authority over vast areas of wetlands that
include lands and waters held in trust by the states under state
law.42 9 But broadly viewed, Rapanos is an example of a case that ad-
dresses the question of what the proper balance should be between
competing interests of private rights in (Rapanos himself is a de-
veloper) and public authority over wetlands and may have
implications for how public trust law is applied in wetlands.2
One commentator asks how lawyers and judges should think
about public trust law: "Is it part of trust law? Is it part of constitu-
tional law? Is it a guideline for the judicial review of administrative
action? Is it simply the police power under another name?' He
422. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 419, at 528, 533-34; Kearney & Merrill, supra note
420, at 800; Lazarus, supra note 46, at 668-74, 693-98.
423. E.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 420, at 800.
424. Writing for the court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, former Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated: "[P]ublic access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
425. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 420, at 800.
426. Huffman, supra note 419, at 528.
427. See, e.g.,Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 765-66 (Wis. 1972).
428. See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 418-21 (1987);
Lazarus, supra note 46, at 668-74.
429. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2215 (2006) (plurality opinion), 2235-36
(Roberts, C.J., concurring), 2236-37 (KennedyJ., concurring), 2252-56 (StevensJ. dissent-
ing).
430. See id. at 2220. The authors offer no view on the question of federal jurisdiction
under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006), as that subject is beyond the
scope of this Article.
431. Huffman, supra note 419, at 527.
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concludes that public trust law is none of these but is best under-
stood, both historically and theoretically, as an aspect of property
law, and that much of modern public trust case law cannot be justi-
fied by this understanding of the doctrine.32 In his view, the public
trust doctrine properly "defines [only] an easement that members
of the public hold in common. "0 33 Delaware, for example, strives to
keep the public trust doctrine in its historical place,434 confining its
application to commercial navigation 43 5 and protecting riparian
and littoral rights down to the low-water mark.436 As already dis-
cussed in some detail above,437 New York still retains some aspects
of the English test for the publicness of a waterway and also main-
tains a commercial navigability test for public rights in navigable-in-
fact waterways, which is similar to Delaware's test though somewhat
broader.
One influential commentator has opined that the Supreme
Court has, or will in the future, undercut the rationale behind the
public trust doctrine, which he believes is rooted in a notion of
"sovereign capacity" ownership.3 8 In particular, he believes that the
public trust doctrine could be viewed by the Court as expressing
"no more than the sovereign's special interest in an aspect of its
general police power." 39 He is concerned that "claims of sovereign
ownership are but legal fictions that offer no special immunity" to
constitutional transgressions. 440 He further notes that recent Court
"decisions in the context of commerce, supremacy, and takings
clause challenges [have] all [been] consistent in this regard.,
4
1
The same commentator has also argued that the public trust
doctrine places undue reliance on a pro-environment judiciary.442
He has expressed concern that protection of the environment is
432. Id. at 527-28.
433. Id. at 527. Contra, Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). A consid-
erable number of U.S. Supreme Court, lower federal court, and state court public trust cases
follow this watershed Supreme Court case. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484
U.S. 469, 474 n.2 (1988); Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550,
552 (8th Cir. 1931); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 373,
375 (Ohio 1959).
434. See, e.g., Groves v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, 1994 Del. Su-
per. LEXIS 80, at *18-19 (Feb. 8, 1994).
435. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7202(d) (2006); Hagan v. Del. Anglers' & Gunners' Club,
655 A.2d 292, 293 (Del. Ch. 1995).
436. State ex el. Buckson v. Pa. R.R. Co., 228 A.2d 587, 595 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
437. See supra Part II.E.
438. Lazarus, supra note 46, at 713-15.
439. Id. at 713.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 713-14.
442. Id. at 712-13.
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too important to be left to the judiciary, which creates public trust
law on a case-by-case basis and might not always be pro-
environment."' As demonstrated by our discussion in Parts II.A-H
above, and because of the common law nature of public trust law
development, gaps exist in the law of most states as to whether a
particular use is protected and how far upstream the doctrine
reaches on a particular waterway. In addition, "regardless of judi-
cial [favor] or desire, courts may lack sufficient competence in
[environmental issues] In particular, "[q]uestions arising in ...
environmental and natural resources law.., can be so inordinately
complex and the competing societal [interests] at stake so funda-
mental that at some level judicial second-guessing of administrative
agency [decisions] may not be particularly productive.'
Some commentators have persuasively argued that the enact-
ment of comprehensive, federal and state environmental
protection statutes, as a practical matter, have greatly diminished
the importance of the public trust as a tool to protect against pol-
lution and damage to natural resources.46 There is little doubt that
these laws-based on government's police powers and adminis-
tered by federal, state, and local agencies-are presently
pervasive. 7 Both administrative agencies and citizen groups find
them far easier to enforce than the common law public trust doc-
trine, which generally can only be enforced by a State Attorney
General, 8 unless a particular state guarantees standing to sue by
449statute or other means.
Other commentators believe that the present public trust doc-
trine does not go far enough, finding it unworkable. ° Several
critics of the trust model for environmental protection question
whether the doctrine, as a practical matter, can achieve the goals of
preserving and restoring ecological integrity and of environmental
443. Id. at 712. But see Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 468-69. Wilkinson points to a par-
ticularly important judicial role in cases that involve constitutional interpretation or the
interpretation of archaic laws. Id. at 468. He emphasizes the role of judges in adapting the
law to the realities of ever-changing social, industrial, and political conditions. Id. at 469. He
also finds that "[sluch assessments of the role of the judiciary fit the public trust doc-
trine... " which is even older than the common law and has "strong constitutional
overtones." Id.
444. Lazarus, supra note 46, at 712.
445. Id.
446. E.g., id. at 676-78.
447. See id. at 665-68, 674-88; see also discussion of state laws and state statutory and
code citations infra Appendix C.
448. See 4 AUSTIN W. ScoiT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS 2754 (2d ed. 1956).
449. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1701 (1) (West 1999); see supra note 117.
450. Seesources cited infra notes 451 and 455.
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sustainability.4 5 ' This view emphasizes the trust doctrine's inher-
ently conservative nature, based in property law, and wonders
whether the doctrine is antagonistic to innovative environmental
protection.452 These commentators believe that the trust approach
will not succeed because trustees will be burdened with the same
natural impulses that drive humans to over-consume resources,
and find it impracticable to overcome these impulses so that the
trust corpus can be managed in a responsible way.53
Another commentator observes that:
[T]wo foundational issues concerning the traditional [trust]
doctrine have still not been decided. The first matter is the
source of the trust-where does it come from? The second is
the scope and definition of the definition of the trust-what
law defines the trust and what is the content of the trust?
454
He has analyzed the Illinois Centrat55 case, the lodestar case in
U.S. public trust law, and concludes that: "[a] persuasive case can
be made that the trust is based on congressional preemption
[based on the Commerce Clause], manifested by implication ei-
ther through a comprehensive legislative scheme or, more
specifically, through the statehood acts., 45 6 This author emphasizes
that "Congress' tradition of mandating that navigable watercourses
be kept open to the public runs deep, from the Northwest Ordi-
nance's guarantee in 1787 that all such rivers and lakes must be
'forever free,' to the pervasive legislation that Congress has since
enacted on the subject of navigability., 457 As to the second question,
he suggests a middle ground.45 He concludes that the trust doc-
trine permits the states wide latitude in administering the trust and
451. Delgado, supra note 419, at 1216; Keith Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observations About
Radical Critique in Environmental Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 225, 243 (2002); Lazarus,
supra note 46, at 710-11.
452. Delgado, supra note 419, at 1214-15; see Lazarus, supra note 46, at 710-11.
453. See Hirokawa, supra note 451, at 243.
454. Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 453. Other commentators have analyzed justice Field's
opinion in the Illinois Central case and raised similar questions: "What resources are covered
by the [trust] doctrine? Does the doctrine rest on federal or state law? Is the doctrine abso-
lute or merely a default rule subject to legislative modification? Does the doctrine permit
intergovernmental transfers or transfers to nonprofit corporations? Who has standing to
enforce the doctrine?" Kearney & Merrill, supra note 420, at 803. Because they believe that
no satisfactory answers can ultimately be given to these questions, they view the doctrine as
unworkable. See id. at 929-30; see also Huffman, supra note 419, at 567.
455. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
456. Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 456.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 460-64.
SUMMER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
developing state public trust law, but that the states are federally
prohibited from abrogating the public trust altogether.459
V. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON THE VALUE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN WATERWAYS AND CONCLUSION
Many authors emphasize the public trust doctrine's fundamental
legitimacy4W° and antiquity.461 One commentator emphasizes the
universal nature of the public interest in major watercourses-in
particular, the reluctance to allow large watercourses to be subject
to wholesale private acquisition-in many countries throughout
the world. 6 He cites ancient Rome, ancient China, Spain, Moslem
countries, Nigeria, and North America before the coming of the
Europeans, as examples.463
As further evidence of its universality, the public trust doctrine
in the United States embodies a fundamental precept that the uses
and contents of some natural resources are so vital to the well-
being of the greater community that they must be protected. 46 The
trust doctrine thus functions to protect public expectations in the
continued use and viability of those vital resources against destabi-
lizing changes, just as the law also protects private property owners
from destabilizing changes.46"
As stated earlier,466 the public trust doctrine should be used in
the Great Lakes states to better protect traditional uses, protect
against impairment of many uses essential to environmental pro-
tection, and help protect the natural character and scenic beauty
of public trust lands and waters. Tourism, which includes recrea-
tional boating, sport fishing, hunting, and wildlife watching,
depends on those protections. It is the largest contributor to the
economy of much of the upper Great Lakes.467 The doctrine pos-
sesses three characteristics that are essential for an effective legal
foundation in aid of environmental protection: 1) a legal right
vested in the public; 2) a right enforceable by, as well as against,
the government; and 3) a fundamental nature of the right that is
459. Id. at 464.
460. See, e.g., COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, supra note 72, at xii-xiii.
461. See Lazarus, supra note 46, at 633-41; Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 425-48.
462. Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 428-30.
463. Id.; see also discussion supra note 400.
464. Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 431-32, 436-39.
465. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 187-89 (1980).
466. See supra Part III.C.
467. GLRC STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 9.
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in harmony with environmental protection and preservation of the
trust.46 The trust obligation also imposes a duty on the government
(almost always a state) to protect a number of beneficial uses of
public waterways, the lands thereunder, and their living contents.
469
The trust doctrine can offer standing to sue where none existed
before.47 ° It affords protections that endure over time for the bene-
fit of present and future generations of beneficiaries.47 ' It can
counteract the excesses of the legislature and state trustee.472
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have summarized what we believe to be the es-
sence of the public trust doctrine, a dynamic legal doctrine that
has evolved as the needs of the country have changed. Just as the
English common law tidal test4 73 for navigability became outmoded
when applied to the vast interior rivers and lakes during the nine-
teenth century, and just as the federal test for navigability474 became
outmoded for state purposes in the twentieth century, the tradi-
tional state navigability test 75 for applying the public trust doctrine
to a waterway, has become outmoded for the twenty-first century.
We have proposed a new three-level test for determining
whether and how the public trust doctrine should apply to a wa-
terway in the Great Lakes system. Because of the system's unique
nature and sensitivity to degradation by a wide range of pollutants
and exotic, invasive species that impact the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the system, 6 the application of the public
trust doctrine to a Great Lakes basin waterway should be deter-
mined based on a broader definition of navigability. Other key
factors-such as whether a right of access to the waterway is suit-
able for that waterway or portions thereof, and whether the right
of access would promote the sustainability of the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the waterway, its submerged lands,
and living contents-should be weighed. The three-level test would
give judicial recognition to a broader range of public uses and
468. See Sax, supra note 61, at 489.
469. E.g., State v. McHugh, 630 So. 2d 1259, 1264-65 (La. 1994).
470. E.g., MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 324.1701(1) (West 1999).
471. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-30(2) (2006).
472. See, e.g., I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892).
473. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 327-328 and accompanying text.
475. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 121.
476. GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS, supra note 5, at 14-15, 30-37.
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afford broader remedies for impairment of those uses than are
currently recognized by the eight Great Lakes states.4" If ever there
were a natural system so fundamental to a region and worthy of
public trust protection, it is the Great Lakes system.
477. See supra Part II.
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APPENDIX A:
SELECTED LITERATURE ON THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
1. The Nature of the Public Trust Doctrine
The nature of the public trust doctrine has been the subject of
much debate in legal scholarship. Various authors have considered
the doctrine as grounded in trust law, property law, constitutional
law, and state police power, or viewed it as a version of the "hard
look" standard forjudicial review.
Books:
1 W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND
WATER, § 2.20, at 162 (1986) (asserting that the
trust doctrine is a justification for strict scrutiny in
the judicial review of state actions)
Articles:
* Daniel Coquillette, Muses from an Old Manse: Another
Look at Some Historical Property Cases about the Envi-
ronment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 811-13 (1979)
(criticizing Joseph Sax's argument against a public
property view of the trust)
* Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist
View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environ-
mental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the
Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1210
(1991) (criticizing the public trust's incremental,
contained nature and its unsuitability for problems
requiring hard choices and global measures (i.e.,
paradigm shifts))
* Richard Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J.
411, 418-21 (1987) (analogizing the public trust
doctrine to the takings doctrine, arguing that both
doctrines are based on the idea that property con-
strains legislatures and prevents them from
colluding with the various "rent-seekers" who at-
tempt to use the political process to redistribute
wealth to themselves; and grounding the doctrine
in the equal protection clause of the Constitution)
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* Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing
Life into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 23, 41-49 (2000) (proposing how trust law
could be applied to enforce the public trust doc-
trine concerning wildlife)
* James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public
Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL.
L. 527, 534, 561-65, 571-72 (1989) (supporting the
view that public trust rights are easements and, as
such, are grounded in property law, but viewing the
modern trust doctrine as infringing on private
property rights and as an effort to avoid just com-
pensation)
* Julian C. Jurgensmeyer & James B. Wadley, The
Common Lands Concept: A "Commons" Solution to a
Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 361, 377-79 (1974) (arguing thatJoseph Sax's po-
sition implies a property right in the public)
* Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the
Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631, 633-641,
715-16 (1986) (asserting that the modern public
trust doctrine is grounded in the property law con-
cept of "sovereign ownership" and as such is a step
backward toward a bygone era)
" Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public
Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1989), reprinted and
updated in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 8, 1
(2003) (discussing the evolution of Joseph Sax's
conceptions of the public trust doctrine and sum-
marizing many authors' views and critiques of the
public trust doctrine)
* Joseph L. Sax, Rights That "Inhere in the Title ItselF':
The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 943, 944, 950-51 (1993) (arguing
that water law delineates rights that are inherently
subject to public constraints and that legal regimes
for water rights have also tended to evolve to incor-
porate concerns for diversity and change)
* Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its
Historical Shackles 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185, 191-94
(1980) (refining his previous notion of the doctrine
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and opining that the essential nature of the doc-
trine is preventing the destabilizing disappointment
of expectations held in common but without formal
recognition such as title)
* Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Re-
sources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REv. 473, 485-89, 556-65 (1970) (the seminal law
review article on the public trust doctrine, focusing
on extending and improving public management of
environmental resources rather than clarifying
whether the doctrine conferred any property right
on the general public as distinct from the legisla-
ture)
* Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Tra-
ditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 456-59 (1989)
(arguing that modern public trust doctrine is not
rooted in property law but in the commerce clause
of the Constitution and became binding on a new
state at statehood and in acts such as the Northwest
Ordinance)
2. The Volume, Scope, and Breadth of Legal Scholarship
on the Public Trust Doctrine
The volume, scope, and breadth of legal scholarship on the pub-
lic trust doctrine since 1970 has been overwhelming. There are
many examples of books, articles, and commentaries on the doc-
trine from all regions of the United States.
Books:
COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (2nd ed. 1997)
* JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971)
* THE LEGAL INST. FOR THE GREAT LAKES, THE PUB-
LIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN OHIO (1999)
VICTOR J. YANNACONE, JR., & BERNARD S. COHEN, 1
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES ch. 2
(1971)
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Articles:
" Michael Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Symposium Article:
The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American
Rule of Capture and the State Ownership of Wildlife, 35
ENVTL. L., 673 (2005)
* Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 388
(1970)
" Kristen M. Fletcher, Regional Ocean Governance: The
Role of the Public Trust Doctrine, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 187 (2006)
* Richard M. Frank, Forever Free: Navigability, Inland
Waterways, and the Expanding Public Interest, 16 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 579 (1983)
" Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, The Public
Trust Doctrine and Sustainable Ecosystems: A Great Lakes
Fisheries Case Study, 14 N.YU. ENVTL. L.J. 322 (2006)
* Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing
Life into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 23 (2000)
Scott D. Hubbard, Everything Old Is New Again,
MICH. B.J. Nov. 2005, at 29.
* Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Pa-
triae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the
State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
F. 57 (2005)
* John Quick, Comment, The Public Trust in Wisconsin,
1 Wis. ENTVL. L.J. 105, 120 (1994)
* Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public
Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998), reprinted and
updated in IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 8, 1,
(2003)
* Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Na-
ture: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993)
" Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from
Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185
(1980)
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Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Re-
sources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 473 (1970)
Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient
Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 195 (1980)
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Tra-
ditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 456-69 (1989)
Student-Written Articles:
* Brent A. Austin, Note, The Public Trust Misapplied:
Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi and the Need to Re-
think an Ancient Doctrine, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967
(1989)
" Bertram C. Frey, Note, The Public Trust in Public Wa-
terways, 7 URB. L. ANN. 219 (1974)
* Melissa K. Scanlan, Comment, The Evolution of the
Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Re-
sources: Courts, Trustees and Political Power in
Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135 (2000)
Dustin Trowbridge Till, Comment, The Right To Float
on By: Why the Washington Legislature Should Expand
Recreational Access to Washington's Rivers and Streams,
28 U. SEATTLE L. REv. 1093 (2005)
" Steven W. Turnbull, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine:
Accommodating the Public Need Within Constitutional
Bounds, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1087 (1988)
* Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Sub-
merged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970)
Many commentators have offered critiques of the public trust
doctrine in natural resource law.
* James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public
Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL.
L. 527, 534, 561-65, 571-72 (1986)
* Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins
of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Hap-
pened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 799
(2004)
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" Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the
Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 633-41,
715-16 (1986)
* Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding Public Trust Doc-
trine: A Warning to Environmentalists and Policy
Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1998)
Given the vast body of literature discussing the public trust doc-
trine, an exhaustive citation of those works is beyond the scope of
this article.
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APPENDIX B:
COMPARISON OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
IN THE GREAT LAKES STATES
CHART I:
OWNERSHIP OF THE GREAT LAKES BEDS
State Ownership
Illinois State, held in trust for public.'
Indiana State, held in trust for public.""
Michigan State, held in trust for public.' °
Minnesota State, held in trust for public.4"
New York State, held in trust for public.'4
Ohio State, held in trust for public."'
Pennsylvania State, held in trust for public."'
Wisconsin State, held in trust for public."'
478. 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2006).
479. Lake Sand Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 120 N.E. 714, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 1918).
480. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 324.32502 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); People v. Massey, 358
N.W.2d 615, 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
481. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 621 (Minn. 1914).
482. Saunders v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 38 N.E. 992,994 (N.Y. 1894).
483. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2006).
484. No specific mention of the public trust's application to the Great Lakes is found in
Pennsylvania cases; however, under federal case law, it appears that the beds of the Great
Lakes passed to the State in trust for the public. See Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 108 Pa. 612,
612-14 (1885); see also Il1. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
485. State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007
(1988).
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CHART II:




Illinois Navigable waterways, as defined by the Illinois International Port District Act, are
public waters that 'are or can be made useable for water commerce." A key inquiry
as to the usefulness of a channel for commerce is whether the waters are sufficiently
deep.4" The fact that there is enough water for small launches or rowboats to pass
over the water does not automatically render the water navigable.4 Nor does the fact
that a lake is not meandered serve as conclusive evidence that the waters are not
navigable." The test is whether the waters can be navigable for useful commerce
and furnish a highway over which commerce was or might be carried on in the
customary modes.4w
Indiana Indiana courts have not clearly defined the term navigable. The most recent definition
is that navigable-in-law is navigable-in-fact."' This definition, however, applies to
rivers and streams for purposes of the public trust, 4 but there is apparently no
Indiana case as to whether the definition applies to lakes. With respect to lakes,
Indiana makes use of a public/private bifurcation as opposed to a navigability test.4 If
a lake is deemed public by the legislature, or if the rparian owner acquiesces to the
public's use of his property, then State law considers it to be a public lake. ' A private,
non-navigable lake is one enclosed and bordered by riparian landowners.' Streams
can be declared navigable by statute,"6 but a stream can be navigable even if not
classified as such by the legislature if it is used for navigation.'  The test in that case
is 'Whether or not [the river] was available and was susceptible for navigation
according to the general rules of river transportation at the time [1816] Indiana was
admitted to the Union. It does not depend on whether it is now navigable.. . . "" "The
true test seems to be the capacity of the stream, rather than the manner or extent of
use."
Michigan A waterway is navigable if the river has the capacity to float logs or timber
seasonally.,' The navigability of an inland waterway depends on its potential for
commercial use; the recreational use test has been repeatedly rejected.' The
absence of prior commercial use, however, does not presumptively establish non-
navigability."2
486. Illinois International Port District Act, 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1810/02 (2006).
487. DuPont v. Miller, 141 N.E. 423, 425 (Ill. 1923); Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 785
(Ill. 1905).
488. Schulte, 75 N.E. at 785.
489. State v. New, 117 N.E. 597,599 (Ill. 1917).
490. Id.
491. State ex rel. Ind. Dep't of Conservation v. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. 1950).
492. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d at 145.
493. IND. CODE § 14-26-2-3 (2006); see also Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984).
494. See IND. CODE § 14-26-2-5(e) (2006).
495. See Bath, 459 N.E.2d at 75.
496. IND. CODE § 14-29-1-2 (2006).
497. Martin v. Bliss, 5 Blackf. 35 (Ind. 1838).
498. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d at 148.
499. Id.
500. Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Mich. 1982).
501. Id. at 845-47.
502. Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 117 (Mich. 1926).
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503. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661, 683 (Minn. 1957).
504. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
505. Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550, 553-54 (8th
Cir. 1931).
506. Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 203 (N.Y. 1997).
507. Smith v. Odell, 137 N.E. 325, 326-27 (N.Y. 1922).
508. See Adirondack League Club v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790-91 (App. Div.
1994).
509. Hickok v. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 523, 527 (1872).
510. Id.
511. Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 373, 378 (Ohio
1959).
512. Id. at 375.
513. Id.
514. Lembeck v Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 688-89 (Ohio 1890).
515. Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909).
516. Id.
517. Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486, 489 (Pa. 1959).
State Definition
Minnesota For purposes of defining title only, Minnesota law considers an inland waterway to be
navigable if it meets the federal, navigable-in-fact test.0, The division of waters into
navigable and non-navigable is simply a method of dividing them into public and
private."' For rivers and streams, Minnesota applies the "floating log" test. If a body of
running water can float logs and timber of substantial quantity during the proper
season, Minnesota considers the river or stream to be navigable and therefore
public."o
New York The law of New York continues to recognize the common law distinction concerning
the rights that a private owner may acquire and retain in non-tidal, navigable-in-fact
rivers and streams, which are distinguishable from public trust protections generally
associated with: 1) waters deemed navigable-in-law or 2) tidal navigable-in-fact
waters. Navigable-in-fact rivers and streams are subject to a public easement for
navigation, but other rights remain with the private owner."' Navigability can be
established through the capacity for commercial use, such as floating logs, but
recreational uses also support the capacity for commercial use."'
Ohio A waterway is navigable if it is capable of transporting the products of the country, or
if commerce is conducted on it." Navigability is established by the capacity for
navigation, not by the frequency of it."' In addition, navigation for pleasure and
recreational purposes is as important as navigation for commercial purposes in the
eyes of the law.5" In particular, when recreational purposes are at issue, Ohio uses a
factor-based test to establish navigability."2 The specific factors to be considered in
determining navigability are: "(1) capacity for boating in its natural condition, (2)
accessibility by public termini, (3) capacity for boating after making reasonable
improvements, and (4) capacity for boating for either recreation or commerce.
'3
Nonetheless, large lakes capable of recreational use can be, and often are, subject to
private ownership."
Pennsylvania Navigable-in-fact means navigable-in-law."' A waterway is navigable-in-fact when it is
sufficiently large and deep to serve the public in providing transportation to any
considerable extent upon its surface."' In particular, navigability depends on whether
the water is used or usable as a broad highway for commerce and transport in
quantity of goods and people, or whether water remains a local focus of attraction; the
basic difference is that between a trade route and a point of interest, with the first
being a public use and the second private.'
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State Definition
Wisconsin Navigability is defined by statute."' All lakes which the public might enjoy are
considered navigable-in-fact.5 9 All streams, sloughs, marsh outlets, and bayous that
are navigable-in-fact for any purpose whatsoever (i.e., floating logs, small boats, or
skiffs) are considered navigable-in-law to the extent that no obstruction may be made
over them without the State's permission."' A stream need not be navigable at all
times of the year, but only have periods of navigability that recur regularly." '
CHART III:
OWNERSHIP OF NAVIGABLE LAKEBEDS
State Ownership
Illinois Title to the beds of all meandered lakes in Illinois, set out in a report entitled
"Meandered Lakes in Illinois," is held in trust by the public regardless of location,
size, or shape. Nevertheless, a non-meandered lake could still be considered
navigable." The test is whether the lake is navigable for useful commerce and
fumishes a highway over which commerce was or might be carried on in the
customary modes 4 If this is the case, the title to the bed of the lake is held by the
State in trust for the public.
Indiana By statute, the State has full control over public freshwater lakes and holds all such
lakes in trust for the use of its citizens for recreational purposes.'
Michigan The riparian owner of a navigable inland lake owns the bottom of the lake to the
center' If the public has a lawful means of access to the lake, then the title of the
riparian owner is subject to the public's right of navigation and fishing. A lake is not a
public navigable water if the lake is a dead-end lake that is completely surrounded by
prvately owned land, even if there is a navigable ingress or egress."
Minnesota The State holds the beds of navigable lakes from the low-water mark in trust for
the people for uses such as commercial navigation, drawing of water for various
purposes, and recreational activity. ° The riparian owners of land bordering a
navigable lake have the right to build and maintain wharves, piers, docks, and
landings in front of their land out to the point of navigability.,,'
New York The riparian owner has title to the center of the lake, subject to the public right to
use if for travel and the right of the State to regulate and control the water for
navigation. The easement of passage over navigable waters, however, does not
involve a surrender of other privileges (undefined in the case law) that are capable
of enjoyment without interference from the navigator.
518. Wis. STAT. § 13.01 (3m) (2007).
519. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972).
520. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Wis. 1952).
521. DeGayner & Co. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 236 N.W.2d 217, 221-22 (Wis. 1975).
522. 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2004) (incorporating by reference Div. OF WATER-
WAYS, ILL. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS & BLDGS., MEANDERED LAKES IN ILLINOIS (1962)).
523. See State v. New, 117 N.E. 597, 599 (Il. 1917).
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. IND. CODE § 14-26-2-5(d) (2006).
527. McCardel v. Smolen, 250 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 273 N.W.2d 3 (Mich. 1978).
528. SeeBott v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Mich. 1982).
529. Mich. Conference Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 245
N.W.2d 412,413-14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
530. See State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 621 (Minn. 1914).
531. State v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971).
532. Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 475-76 (1883).
533. Id. at 479.
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State Ownership
Ohio The bottoms of navigable lakes are owned by the title holder subject to certain
rights, such as navigation, remaining with the public."' "A lake which is not really
useful for navigation, although of considerable size compared with ordinary fresh-
water streams, may be private property [with all rights vested in the title holder].""
Pennsylvania If a lake is considered navigable, the riparian owner only takes to the low-water
mark, subject to the public's right of navigation, fishing, and other proper uses up
to the high-water mark."' Riparian rights, however, are subject to disposition as
any other portion of land."' They may be sold, reserved, or severed.m Ownership
of a strip of land along a lake gives no right of ownership in the lake itself; rather,
the title to the lakebed can rest entirely in a separate owner."' A public easement
of navigation remains on all navigable lakes."'
Wisconsin Title to the beds of all navigable lakes is vested in the State."' A specific part of a
lake need not itself be navigable to be considered public trust lakebed, so long as it
is part of a lake that is navigable."' The trust doctrine prevents the State from
granting substantial areas of lakebed for private purposes.'
CHART IV:
OWNERSHIP OF NON-NAVIGABLE LAKEBEDS
State Ownership
Illinois Except for meandered lakes,'" the bed is held in fee simple by the riparian owner.m
Illinois applies the civil law rule wherein ownership of the lakebed does not constitute
ownership of the water above it. Therefore, an owner of a portion of the lakebed has
the right to navigate and enjoy the waters of the entire lake.'"
Indiana The owner of land bordering a non-navigable, private lake takes title to all land
included in the subdivision of which his land is part."' Although not a model of clarity,
Indiana case law defines a private lake as a body of water on the surface of land
within the exclusive dominion and control of the surrounding owners.m For these
private lakes, Indiana applies the common law rule wherein "[e]ach owner has the
right to the free and unmolested use and control of his portion of the lake bed and
water thereon for boating and fishing.""'
534. See Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492, 512 (1878) (by implication).
535. Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 688 (Ohio 1890) (quoting Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36
Barb. 102 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1862)).
536. Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869).
537. Gibbs v. Sweet, 20 Pa. Super. 275, 282 (1902).
538. Id.
539. See Matthews v. Bagnik, 41 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945).
540. Wood, 63 Pa. at 221.
541. State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988).
542. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d at 342.
543. See Mendota Club v. Anderson, 78 N.W. 185, 189 (Wis. 1899).
544. See 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2004) (incorporating by reference Div. OF WATER-
WAYS, ILL. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS & BLDGS., MEANDERED LAKES IN ILLINOIS (1962)).
545. Beckman v. Kreamer, 43 Ill. 447, 448 (1877).
546. See, e.g., Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass'n, 526 N.E.2d 154, 156-57 (Il.
1988) (including a detailed discussion about the historical development of the common law
rule and the civil law rule in the various states).
547. Stoner v. Rice, 22 N.E. 968, 968-69 (Ind. 1889); see also Tolleston Club of Chi. v. Car-
son, 123 N.E. 169, 174-75 (Ind. 1919) (noting criticism of, and following, the Stonerdecision).
548. Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
549. Carnahan v. Moriah Prop. Owners Ass'n, 716 N.E.2d 437,441 (Ind. 1999) (quoting
Sanders v. De Rose, 191 N.W. 331 (Ind. 1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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550. Putnam v. Kinney, 227 N.W. 741, 742 (Mich. 1929).
551. See id.
552. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139,1143 (Minn. 1893).
553. Id.
554. Id. at 1143-44.
555. Petraborg v. Zontelli, 15 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Minn. 1944) (citing Red River Roller
Mills v. Wright, 14 N.W. 167, 169 (Minn. 1883)).
556. Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 473 (1883).
557. See Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686,688 (Ohio 1890).
558. Id. at 688-89.
559. Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909) (approving of Justice
Mitchell's reasoning in Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143).
560. Gibbs v. Sweet, 20 Pa. Super. 275, 282 (1902).
561. Id.
562. SeeSmoulterv. Boyd, 58 A. 144, 152 (Pa. 1904).
563. See Mayer v. Grueber, 138 N.W.2d. 197, 202 (Wis. 1965).
564. See id. at 203.
565. See id. at 205.
State Ownership
Michigan The riparian owner holds private title to the middle of the lake."' Michigan applies the
civil law rule wherein ownership of part of a lakebed gives the title holder the right to
reasonable use of the entire lake." '
Minnesota For those few lakes that do not meet the beneficial public use test, the riparian owner
takes title to the center of the lake.' Thus, for most non-navigable lakes, the riparian
owner takes title to the center of the lake.! In these instances, Minnesota applies the
civil rule and all riparian owners have the right to reasonable use of the entire lake.4
In determining reasonable use, Minnesota courts consider factors including the type
of use, the size of the waterway, and the importance of the use."
New York The title holder of the lakebed owns private title."
Ohio The title holder of the lakebed owns private title." If a lakebed is privately owned,
then neither the public nor the owner of adjacent lands whose title extends to the
water's edge has the right to navigate or fish on the waters.
Pennsylvania For non-navigable lakes, the riparian owner generally takes to the center of the
lake." Riparian rights, however, are subject to disposition the same as any other
portion of land. They may be sold, reserved, or severed." ' If a lakebed is privately
owned, then neither the public nor the owner of adjacent lands whose title extends to
the water's edge has the right to navigate or fish on the waters.'
Wisconsin The State holds title to all natural lakebeds in trust to the ordinary high-water mark.
The beds of artificial lakes, or ponds created by means other than modifying a natural
lake or stream, are owned by the riparian owner, subject only to any deed
restrictions. In this instance, the common law rule, as opposed to the civil law rule,
applies so that ownership of a lakebed includes ownership of the water above it, and
the owner of the lakebed can prevent others from utilizing her property.'
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CHART V:
OWNERSHIP OF NAVIGABLE RIVERBEDS
State Ownership
Illinois Unless clearly stated otherwise, a grant of land carries with it title to the center of the
stream." This is true whether or not the stream is considered navigable.w For those
streams deemed navigable-in-fact, the public retains an inalienable right of easement
for navigation.' Title to the beds of meandered lakes (as surveyed by the
govemment), many of which were formerly rivers, remains with the State."
Indiana Two classes of streams exist within Indiana that are deemed navigable. One is only
navigable for certain kinds of craft for certain distances within the State and is not
useful for interstate commerce. This class of stream is generally declared navigable
by the legislature. The State retains exclusive jurisdiction over these streams and
rivers and may authorize obstructions of them for the public good. The other class of
navigable streams and rivers is composed of those navigable-in-fact for vessels
engaged in interstate travel and commerce. The State has equal jurisdiction over
these waters subject to the power of the national legislature to regulate them."' For
each type of navigable river or stream, private title extends to the low-water mark with
the right to wharf out to aid navigation."'
Michigan Title is in the riparian owner5  This is true whether the river is navigable or non-
navigable. However, this ownership is subject to the public rights of navigation and
fishing on navigable rivers."'
Minnesota By statute, the ownership of the beds of all rivers that are navigable is in the State in
fee simple, subject to regulation by the national legislature.5
New York In New York, a distinction remains between non-tidal, navigable-in-fact rivers and
waters deemed navigable-in-law or tidal navigable-in-fact. ' Grants by the State to
private owners of land under non-tidal, navigable-in-fact rivers is subject to an implied
reserved public easement of navigation, but such easement does not displace other
rights accompanying private ownership of the bed, including that of an exclusive
fishery.' n Moreover, the public's right to navigate includes the right to use the
streambed to detour around natural objects and portage if necessary." Furthermore,
the State retains the right to improve non-tidal, navigable-in-fact rivers for the public
purpose of navigation." The title to the beds of tidal, navigable-in-law rivers remains
vested in the State.' Note, however, that the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers do not fall
under this general rule because they were never conveyed away by the State.
Therefore, the State retains full title in the beds of these non-tidal, navigable-in-fact
rivers."
566. Trs. of Sch. v. Schroll, 12 N.E. 243, 244-45 (Ill. 1887).
567. See id.
568. Schuhe v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 785 (Il1. 1905).
569. 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2004) (incorporating by reference Div. OF WATER-
WAYS, ILL. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS & BLDGS., MEANDERED LAKES IN ILLINOIS (1962)).
570. Depew v. Bd. of Trs. of the Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8, 9 (1854).
571. Ross v. Faust, 54 Ind. 471, 474 (1876).
572. Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115,117 (Mich. 1926).
573. Sewers v. Hacklander, 188 N.W. 547, 549 (Mich. 1922).
574. Id. at 549-50.
575. MINN. STAT. § 103G.711 (2006).
576. Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 203 (N.Y. 1997).
577. Smith v. Odell, 137 N.E. 325, 326-27 (N.Y. 1922).
578. Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.YS.2d 788, 793 (App. Div. 1994).
579. Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 485-86 (1883).
580. Id. at 479.
581. Id. at 481-83.
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State Ownership
Ohio Title to lands bordering a navigable stream extends to the middle of the stream."
Such title remains subject to the public right to use the waterway for the purpose of
navigation.58
Pennsylvania Title to lands bordering a navigable stream extends to the low-water mark, subject to
the public right of navigaton up to the high-water mark.4
Wisconsin Title of a riparian owner extends to the center of the stream, subject to the public's
right of navigation if the stream is navigable."'
CHART VI:
LINE TO WHICH PRIVATE OWNERSHIP EXTENDS ON LAKES
AND EXTENT OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS ON LAKES
State
Illinois On Lake Michigan and lakes meandered by a government (whether navigable or non-
navigable), private title extends to the waters edge."' On other navigable and non-
navigable lakes, ownership of the submerged soil is in the riparian owner." In
addition, Illinois employs the civil law rule where ownership of a part of a non-
navigable lakebed entitles owners to the "reasonable use and enjoyment of the
surface waters of the entire lake provided they do not interfere with the reasonable
use of the waters by other riparian owners."
Indiana A riparian owner of land adjacent to a public freshwater lake does not have the
exclusive right of ownership thereof, but only a qualified title. The owner of land
bordering a non-navigable inland lake takes title to all land included in the subdivision
on which his land is part."
Michigan On the Great Lakes, title of a riparian owner stops at the low-water mark, even if the
water is unfit for navigation due to aquatic plants, etc."' On all navigable lakes,
including the Great Lakes, absolute title only extends to the high-water mark. The
area between high- and low-water mark is subordinate to the jus pubicum, including
the right to walk along the shore between the high- and low-water mark. The
riparian owner of a navigable inland lake owns the bottom of the lake to the center,
subject to the public's right of navigation.m Where there are several riparian owners
of the same private, inland lake, the owners may use the surface of the entire lake
provided they do not interfere with the reasonable use of the water by other riparian
owners.'
582. Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492, 512 (1878).
583. Walker v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 16 Ohio 540, 543-44 (1847).
584. Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869).
585. Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273, 275 (Wis. 1898).
586. See Schuhe v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 784 (Ill. 1905).
587. Id. at 787.
588. Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass'n, 526 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ill. 1988).
589. See IND. CODE § 14-26-2-5(e) (2007).
590. Stoner v. Rice, 22 N.E. 968, 968-69 (Ind. 1889); see also Tolleston Club of Chi. v.
Carson, 123 N.E. 169, 174-75 (Ind. 1919) (noting criticism of, and following, the Stoner
decision).
591. People v. Warner, 74 N.W. 705, 710 (Mich. 1898).
592. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 71, 73 (Mich. 2005).
593. Putnam v. Kinney, 227 N.W. 741, 741-42 (Mich. 1929).
594. Id. at 742.
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595. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 623 (Minn. 1914).
596. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1971).
597. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139,1141 (Minn. 1893).
598. Chism v. Smith, 123 N.Y.S. 691, 694-95 (App. Div. 1910).
599. See Saunders v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 38 N.E. 992, 994 (N.Y. 1894)
(discussing in dicta how the legal principles set forth in Illinois Central regarding ownership
of the submerged lands of the Great Lakes apply in New York).
600. See Chism, 123 N.Y.S. at 694-95. Justice Kellogg's dissenting opinion discusses this
point of law with more specificity. Id. at 695-96.
601. Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 464 (1883).
602. Calkins v. Hart, 113 N.E. 785, 785 (N.Y. 1916).
603. Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492, 512 (1878).
604. Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 688 (Ohio 1890).
605. Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869).
606. Id.
607. Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909).
608. Smoulter v. Boyd, 58 A. 144, 146 (Pa. 1904).
609. State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342-43 (Wis. 1987).
610. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914).
State
Minnesota On navigable lakes, private title extends to the low-water mark, but it is absolute only
to the high-water mark."' The land between high- and low-water mark is subject to
certain recognized public rights of use (such as navigation), but this does not include
the construction of a concrete support for a public highway.m If the lake is non-
navigable, the owner of the riparian land takes title to the center of the lake.'"
New York Private title extends to the low-water mark in medium and large lakes,=" including
Lake Erie,' " subject to the public right to use the lake for travel and the right of the
State to regulate and control the water for navigation.= For smaller navigable lakes,
the riparian owner takes title to the center of the lake, subject to the public right to use
the lake for travel and the right of the State to regulate and control the water for
navigation.w' For non-navigable inland lakes, the riparian owner takes title to the
center of the lake.m
Ohio Private title extends to the low-water mark on navigable lakes.= Non-navigable lakes
are subject to private ownership.3
Pennsylvania Private title extends to the low-water mark, but it is absolute only to the high-water
mark. The land between the low-water mark and the high-water mark is subject to
the public right of passage.' Non-navigable lakes are subject to private ownership.w1
Pennsylvania applies the common law rule wherein ownership of the bed of a non-
navigable lake includes ownership of the water above it, and the owner of the lakebed
can prevent others from utilizing his or her property.'
Wisconsin Private title extends to the low-water mark, but it is absolute only to the high-water
mark on all navigable lakes and ponds." The high-water mark is defined as "the point
on the bank or shore up to which the presence and action of the water is so
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial
vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic."" '
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CHART VII:
LINE TO WHICH PRIVATE OWNERSHIP EXTENDS ON RIVERS
State
Illinois Private ownership extends to the center of the river, "' but it is subject to the public
easement of navigation if the river is either: 1) navigable-in-fact,61 or 2) now deemed
a meandered lake but was formerly a river.'
Indiana In general, private ownership extends to the low-water mark on navigable rivers."' On
non-navigable rivers, private title extends to the thread of the stream.'
Michigan Private ownership extends to the thread of the stream in both navigable and non-
navigable rivers.' For navigable rivers, this title is subject to the navigational
servitude, and fishing is the only recreational use recognized as incident to the
navigational servitude.' 7 Riparian ownership includes the right to wharf out to
navigable waters,' but a permit is necessary for such construction.'
Minnesota The State owns the bed in fee simple under all rivers that are deemed navigable.
The riparian owners title extends to the low-water mark on the navigable water that
borders her property. The riparian owner's title, however, is only absolute to the
ordinary high-water mark' The riparian owner has the right to wharf out to the point
of navigability in order to facilitate access to the water. Title to the beds of non-
navigable rivers extends to the center of the river.'
New York Private ownership extends to the center of the stream unless otherwise stated, but
title is only absolute to the high-water mark on navigable-in-fact rivers.' The public
retains the right of navigation and use of the shore below the ordinary high-water
mark to portage around natural objects."'
611. Tr. of Schs. v. Schroll, 12 N.E. 243,244 (Ill. 1887).
612. Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 785 (Ill. 1905).
613. 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2006). See generally Div. oF WATERWAYS, ILL. DEP'T OF
PUB. WORKS & BLDGS., MEANDERED I.AKES IN ILLINOIS (1962).
614. Ross v. Faust, 54 Ind. 471, 474 (1876).
615. Id.
616. Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 117 (Mich. 1926); Sewers v. Hacklander, 188
N.W. 547,549 (Mich. 1922).
617. Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Mich. 1982).
618. Tennant v. Recreation Dev Corp., 249 N.W2d 348, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
619. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32513 (West Supp. 2006).
620. MINN. STAT. § 103G.711 (2006).
621. State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971).
622. See Hobart v. Hall, 174 F. 433, 445 (C.C.D. Minn. 1909).
623. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 NW. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
624. Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463,464 (1883).
625. Adirondack League Club, Inc. %v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788, 793 (App. Div.
1994).
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626. Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492, 512 (1878).
627. Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 689 (Ohio 1890).
628. Walker v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 16 Ohio 540, 544 (1847).
629. Bodi v. Winous Point Shooting Club, 48 N.E. 944, 944 (Ohio 1897); E. Bay Sport-
ing Club v. Miller, 161 N.E. 12, 13 (Ohio 1928).
630. Walker, 16 Ohio at 544.
631. Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
632. E. Bay Sporting Club, 161 N.E. at 16.
633. Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 688-89 (Ohio 1890).
634. Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1870).
635. Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909).
636. Gibbs v. Sweet, 20 Pa. Super. 275, 282 (Super. Ct. 1902).
637. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Wis. 1952).
638. Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273, 275 (Wis. 1898).
639. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 740 F.
Supp. 1400, 1424 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
State
Ohio Private title extends to the middle of the river whether navigable or not,2 with the
exception of the Ohio River where the low-water mark serves as the boundary line.="
On navigable rivers, title is only absolute to the low-water mark, and it is subject to the
public easement of navigation." ' In addition, the right of public fishery goes together
with that of navigation."' When a waterway is considered navigable, the riparian
owner retains the right to wharf out to the point of navigability but cannot interfere with
the public's right of navigation or fishery. ° Moreover, such wharf or pier must lie
within the projected boundaries of the riparian owner's waterfront property."3
Furthermore, when the stream is considered non-navigable, it can be privately
owned."' In this case, neither the public nor the owner of adjacent lands whose title
only extends to the margin of the stream enjoys the right to navigate or fish on the
waters.'
Pennsylvania If a river is considered navigable, the riparian owner only takes to the low-water mark,
subject to the public's rights of navigation, fishing, and other proper uses up to the
high-water mark."' If a river is considered non-navigable, the riparian owner generally
takes to the middle of the waterway.m Riparian rights are completely severable, and
an interest in the bottomland of non-navigable rivers may be disposed of the same
way as any other property interest. '
Wisconsin For land that touches a stream or river, the riparian owner's title extends to the center
of the stream, subject to the public's right of use if the stream is navigable.m Absolute
title extends only to the ordinary high-water mark on navigable rivers, though the
riparian owner retains the right to wharf out to aid in navigation, so long as it does not
interfere with other riparian owner's rights. ' On non-navigable streams, the riparian
owner's rights are absolute.m
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CHART VIII:
PUBLIC RIGHTS TO HUNT, FISH AND FOWL
State
Illinois The right to hunt and fish is not connected with the easement of navigation but rather
with the ownership of the soil underlying the waterway. "'
Indiana If a waterway is deemed public, then the right to fish is vested in the public, along with
the right of navigation."' If a waterway is deemed private, then riparian owners only
have the right to hunt, fish, fowl, and navigate on water over land to which they
actually hold title.6"'
Michigan On any navigable-in-fact waterway, the public retains the rights of fishing, hunting,
navigation, and other public uses."'
Minnesota On any public waterway, the public has the right to enjoy recreational uses such as
fishing, hunting, and fowling, and the riparian owner enjoys no exclusive privileges."
New York In navigable-in-law waters, including Lake Erie, tidal waters, boundary waters, and
portions of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, the public has a right to navigate and
fish.w The public easement of navigation does not include the right to fish or hunt
upon those waters. Rather, these rights remain with the titleholder to the bed of the
waterway.'
Ohio The right of a public fishery goes together with that of navigation."' The right to hunt
or fowl on public waterways appears not to be covered by the public trust doctrine.
Pennsylvania If a lake or river is considered navigable, the public has a right to fish and use the
waterway for other proper uses.'
Wisconsin The public retains a right to hunt, fish, fowl, and recreate up to the high-water mark of
any navigable waterway.6"
640. Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 784 (Ill. 1905).
641. Lake Sand Co. v. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 120 N.E. 714, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 1918);
Bainbridge v. Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364, 367-68 (1868).
642. Carnahan v. Moriah Prop. Owners Ass'n, 716 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind. 1999).
643. Putnam v. Kinney, 227 N.W. 741, 741 (Mich. 1929).
644. Petraborg v. Zontelli, 15 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn. 1944); Nelson v. Delong, 213
Minn. 425,431 (1942).
645. Strawberry Island Co. v. Cowles, 140 N.YS. 333, 337-38 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Douglas-
ton Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 89 N.Y.2d 472, 480 (1997).
646. Smith v. Odell, 137 N.E. 325, 326-27 (N.Y. 1922).
647. Bodi v. Winous Point Shooting Club, 48 N.E. 944, 944 (Ohio 1897).
648. Freeland v. Pa. R.R. Co., 47 A. 745, 746 (Pa. 1901).
649. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. %. Dep't of Natural Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Wis.
1978).
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CHART IX:
RIGHT TO WHARF OUT/BUILD OTHER STRUCTURES
ON NAVIGABLE WATERS
615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18 (2006).
Id.
IND. CODE §§ 14-18-16-1, 14-18-16-3 (2006).
Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
IND. CODE § 14-29-1-8 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Tennant v. Recreation Dev. Corp., 249 N.W.2d 348, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971).
People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521, 524 (N.Y. 1916).
Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
See Palmer v. Farrell, 18 A. 761, 761-62 (Pa. 1889).
Wls. STAT. § 30.13 (2006).
Illinois A permit must be obtained in order to construct any sort of wharf, pier, or jetty on
public navigable water,"' with the exception of duck blinds that comply with
regulations of the Department of Natural Resources.'
Indiana A riparian owner on the banks of Lake Michigan may not fill in property or construct a
dock or wharf beyond the dock or harbor line established by the United States.' For
public lakes, the riparian owner has the right to wharf out to a reasonable extent,
meaning to a point that does not interfere with the use of the lake by others. For
navigable rivers and streams, a permit must be obtained from the Indiana Department
of Natural Resources before a person can "place, fill, or erect a permanent structure"
in the waterway."
Michigan Michigan allows some filling in of submerged lands as long as the fill does not
substantially affect the public use for hunting, fishing, swimming, or navigation, and as
long as the public trust will not be damaged as a result of such an agreement for the
sale, lease, use, or other such agreement.m A riparian owner must obtain a State
permit before dredging or placing any materials on the beds of the Great Lakes.' For
other navigable waters, the riparian owner enjoys the right to wharf out to the point of
navigation. 7
Minnesota A riparian owner can build and maintain wharves, piers, and docks so long as they do
not interfere with the use of the waters by the public.m
New York Riparian owners have the right to wharf out to the point of navigation."
Ohio Riparian owners have the right to wharf out in order to aid navigation.
Pennsylvania Riparian owners have the right to wharf out to the point of navigation."
Wisconsin Riparian owners have the right to wharf out beyond the high-water mark in order to
aid navigation so long as such construction does not interfere with the public's
rights.m
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Illinois In the riparian ownerm
Indiana In the riparian owner4
Michigan In the riparian ownerm
Minnesota In the riparian owner"
New York In the riparian ownerw
Ohio In the riparian ownerm
Pennsylvania In the riparian owner
Wisconsin In the riparian owner
663. See Revell v. People 52 N.E. 1052, 1057 (Ill. 1898).
664. IND. CODE § 14-26-2-8 (2006).
665. Peterman v. Dep't of Natural Res., N.W.2d 499, 507 (Mich. 1994).
666. Reads Landing Campers Ass'n v. Twp. of Pepin, 546 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1996).
667. Hempstead v. Little, 239 N.E.2d 722, 725 (N.Y 1968).
668. State ex rel. Duffy v. Lakefront E. Fifty-Fifth St. Corp., 27 N.E.2d 485, 486 (Ohio
1940).
669. Black v. Am. Int'l Corp., 107 A. 737, 738 (Pa. 1919).
670. Doemel v.Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 396 (Wis. 1923).
The Public Trust in Surface Waterways
CHART XI:
STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
State Who has standing to sue?
Illinois State attorney general and State tax payers who are beneficiares of the trust
"
'
Indiana State attorney general
Michigan State attorney general and any person
Minnesota State attorney general
New York State attorney general and State citizens
673
671. In the seminal case on this point, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled its prior
decisions that citizen standing must be expressly provided by statue, stating:
If the "public trust" doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all, the members of
the public, at least taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust, must have the
right and standing to enforce it. To tell them that they must wait upon governmental
action is often an effectual denial of the right for all time.
Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970).
672. Under Michigan statutory law, "any person may maintain an action in the circuit
court having jurisdiction ... for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these re-
sources from pollution, impairment, or destruction." MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701
(West 2006) (emphasis added). A private party's right to sue under Michigan's public trust
doctrine was exercised in at least one case prior to statutory codification of the right.
Obrecht v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. 1960). In Obrecht, the plaintiffs sued to
enjoin the construction of a dock, arguing, inter alia, that pursuant to Michigan's public
trust doctrine the defendant riparian owner did not own the submerged lands of Lake
Huron and thus did not have the right to wharf out. Id. at 146.
673. It is evident from New York case law that State citizens have standing to sue under
the State's public trust doctrine, but it is not clear whether the petitioner must be a benefi-
ciary of the trust. See, e.g., Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 85 N.E. 1093, 1095 (N.Y.
1908) (deciding case where riparian owner sued to enforce the public's right to walk across a
beach in front of the neighboring property owner's land); Kuzma v. City of Buffalo, 816
N.YS.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (deciding case where petitioners, who included the president
of an unincorporated association that opposed the development in question, residents of
the town, and the city council president sought an injunction, arguing, inter alia, that sale of
the property in question violated the New York State public trust doctrine); Jones v. Ami-
cone, 812 N.Y.S.2d 111, 114-15 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (deciding case where petitioners, who
included local property owners, an area merchant, area residents, and an organization of
area merchants, sought declaratory relief under New York's public trust doctrine to prevent
the city from acting outside the scope of its authority); Roosevelt Island Residents Ass'n v.
Roosevelt Island Operating Corp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (deciding case brought
by resident's association to enjoin private construction, development, and renovation that
violated New York's public trust doctrine); Kenny v. Bd. of Trs., 735 N.Y.S.2d. 606 (App. Div.
2001) (deciding case brought by citizens seeking to enjoin the village from leasing parkland
property to a private party in violation of New York's public trust doctrine and the public's
right to recreational use of the parkland). Although the majority of the cited cases pertain
to New York parkland, all of the listed cases are relevant to this analysis because "New York
courts have extended the public trust doctrine beyond the waters to include parkland." 10 E.
Realty L.L.C. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, No. 50561 (U), slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006)
(citing Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y.
2001)).
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State Who has standing to sue?
Ohio State attorney general
Pennsylvania State attorney general; the people of the State of Pennsylvania also have limited
standing to sue the State to enforce the public trust rights afforded to them in the
State constitution.b'
Wisconsin State attorney general, State public intervenor, and any person suing in the name of
the Statem
CHART XII:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED
UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
State Environmental Protection
Illinois Presumably yes. The State has a strong interest in conservation and environmental
protection."
Indiana Yes. "Protection of the environment is a public trust."
Michigan Yes. 'The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the circuit court
... for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air,
water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from
pollution, impairment, or destruction.'
674. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
675. In State v. Deetz, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly provided that persons act-
ing in the name of the State have standing to protect their public rights in navigable waters:
We believe that the District Court properly stated the law of Wisconsin. The public
trust doctrine merely establishes standing for the [S]tate, or any person suing in the
name of the [S]tate for the purpose of vindicating the public trust, to assert a cause
of action recognized by the existing law of Wisconsin.
State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 413 (Wis. 1974). The State public intervenor, an office cre-
ated by statute to protect public rights in water and other natural resources, is authorized to
intervene in all actions where protection of those rights is at issue. Wis. STAT. § 165.07
(2006). This includes the right to initiate an action against another Wisconsin agency. See id.
676. In People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., the court emphasized the importance of con-
sidering the public's interest when determining whether a specific action of the State violated
the public trust doctrine; the court also stated that, in Illinois, "there has developed a strong
... interest in conserving natural resources and in protecting and improving our physical envi-
ronment." People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 780 (111. 1977); see also Comm'n
Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 323 N.E.2d 84, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (stating in dicta that
"[t]his court, whenever possible, will approve actions taken by the expert administrative agen-
cies in this [S] tate charged with the public trust to cleanse our environment").
677. Peabody Coal Co. v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 664 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (Ind. 1996)
(applying to Indiana's public trust doctrine in general even though specifically in regard to
a violation of the Indiana Surface Mining Act). The Indiana Lakes Preservation Act also
extends environmental protection to Indiana's public freshwater lakes and provides that the
State "holds and controls all public freshwater lakes in trust for the use of all of the citizens
of Indiana...." Indiana Lakes Preservation Act, IND. CODE § 14-26-2-5(d) (2) (2006); see also
IND. NATURAL RES. COMM'N, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE ON NAVIGABLE WATERS AND
PUBLIC FRESHWATER LAKES AND THE LAKE MGMT. WORKGROUPS, Information Bulletin #41
(March 1, 2004), http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/20070214-IR-312070073NRA.xml.pdf.
678. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701 (1) (West 1999).
The Public Trust in Surface Waterways
State Environmental Protection
Minnesota Presumably yes.'n
New York Yes. "The entire ecological system supporting the waterways is an integral part of
them (the waterways) and must necessarily be included within the purview of the
[public] trust." w
Ohio No.
Pennsylvania Yes. 'The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people."O'
Wisconsin Yes. "[S]tate of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to eradicate the present
pollution and to prevent further pollution in its navigable waters." '
CHART XIII:
SCENIC BEAUTY EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED UNDER
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
State Scenic Beauty
Illinois No.
Indiana Yes. Indiana statutory law provides that the 'natural resources and the natural scenic
beauty of Indiana are a public right,'" and that the State "holds and controls all public
freshwater lakes" and Indiana's natural, scenic, and recreational river systems in trust
for all citizens of lndiana."




679. Based on common and statutory law, there is no explicit right to environmental
protection under Minnesota's public trust doctrine. Nonetheless, in State ex rel. Head v.
Slotness, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that it would not "in any way determine the
State's power to establish restrictions upon a riparian owner's future improvement or recla-
mation of the submerged lake bed of navigable waters necessary to the environmental
interests of the people in public waters." State ex re. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 534
(Minn. 1971).
680. Smithtown v. Poveromo, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 775 (Dist. Ct. 1972), revd on other
grounds, 359 N.YS.2d 848 (App. Term 1973); see also W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. New York, 672
N.YS.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (giving an historical overview of the role of govern-
ment as the guardian of natural resources and demonstrating the role's great antiquity).
681. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
682. Just v. Marinette, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); accordWis. Envtl. Decade, Inc.
v. Dep't of Natural Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Wis. 1978).
683. IND. CODE § 14-26-2-5(c)(1) (2006); Lake of the Woods v. Ralston, 748 N.E.2d 396,
401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
684. IND. CODE §§ 14-26-2-5(d)(2), 14-29-6 (2006).
685. In granting permits for proposed structures or projects impacting inland lakes and
streams, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources must consider, among other mat-
ters under the trust doctrine, whether the structure or project would "unlawfully impair or
destroy" the aesthetics of the inland lake or stream. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.30106
(West 2006); see also § 324.1704.
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686. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (emphasis added).
687. State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W. 2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987). "The natural beauty of our
northern lakes is one of the most precious heritages Wisconsin citizens enjoy. It is entirely
proper that that natural beauty should be protected as against specific structures that may
be found to mar that beauty." Claflin v. Dep't of Natural Res., 206 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Wis.
1973) (remanding the case to the lower court to determine whether or not a single boat-
house impaired natural beauty).
State Scenic Beauty
Ohio No.
Pennsylvania Yes. The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people."'
Wisconsin Yes. "The rights Wisconsin citizens enjoy with respect to bodies of water held in trust
by the [S]tate include the enjoyment of natural scenic beauty ....
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APPENDIX C:
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICE POWER AUTHORITIES
Illinois
The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Ill. EPA) en-
forces the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, which is Illinois'
primary statute for protecting, restoring, and enhancing the envi-
ronment. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 (2006).
The Illinois Department of Natural Resources (Ill. DNR) admin-
isters regulatory programs, under the authority of Illinois statutes,
for conserving and preserving the State's natural resources. Spe-
cifically, the Ill. DNR administers: Illinois Rivers, Lakes, and
Streams Act, 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 (2006); Illinois Waterway Act,
615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 (2006); Illinois Navigable Waters Obstruc-
tion Act, 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15 (2006); and various other Illinois
statutes dealing with Illinois waterways found in Chapter 615 "Wa-
terways" of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
through 110/ (2006). Ill. DNR also administers various acts under
Chapter 525 "Conservation" of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. 525
ILL. COMP. STAT. 1 et seq. (2006). In addition, under the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, Ill. DNR is responsible for reviewing
United States Army Corps of Engineers permit applications. 16
U.S.C. § 661 (2006).
Lastly, Ill. EPA is responsible for administering the Illinois Lake
Management Program Act, and Ill. DNR and the Illinois Depart-
ment of Agriculture must assist Ill. EPA in developing a framework
plan for administering the requirements of the Act. 525 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 25 (2006).
Indiana
The Indiana Department of Environmental Management
(IDEM) has the power and the duty to implement Indiana's envi-
ronmental laws, set forth in Title 13 "Environment" of the Indiana
Code. IND. CODE §§ 13-11 through 13-30 (2006).
IDEM is also designated as: (1) Indiana's water pollution agency
for all purposes of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33
U.S.C. §§ 1251 through 1270 (XXX) and the federal Safe Drinking
Water Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 300f through 300j (2006)); (2) Indiana's
solid waste agency for all purposes of the federal Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 through 6992k
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(2006)); (3) Indiana's air pollution control agency for all purposes
of the federal Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 through 7 671q
(2006)); (4) the State agency with responsibility for the Midwest
Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste under IND.
CODE § 13-29-1; (5) the State agency with responsibility for the fed-
eral Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 through 9675 (2006)); and
(6) the State agency with responsibility for the federal Defense En-
vironmental Restoration Program (10 U.S.C. §§ 2701 through 2708
(2006)).
The Indiana Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) has the
power and duty to administer the provisions set forth in Title 14
"Natural Resources" of the Indiana Code. IND. CODE §§ 14-8-1
through 14-8-3-9 (2006).
Michigan
Michigan's Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) was cre-
ated under the Michigan Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act (NREPA) (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.101
through 324.90106 (2006)) and is authorized to perform the du-
ties granted and imposed by NREPA and as otherwise provided by
law. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.501 (2006).
Michigan's Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)
is responsible for carrying out certain provisions of NREPA dealing
with environmental protection and pollution control.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.1701-324.1706, 324.1801-324.1808,
324.19601-324.19616, 324.2101-324.2162, 324.2521, 324.30501-
324.30515, 324.33101-324.33105, 324.33301-324.33301, 324.33701-
324.33708, 324.35101-324.35111, 324.35501-324.35506, 324.35701-
324.35706, 324.35801-324.35804, 324.35901-324.35904, 324.4301-
324.4312, 324.4501-324.4511,324.4701-324.4712, 324.4901-
324.4912, 324.60301-324.60309, 324.61001-324.61004, 324.62101-
324.62103, 324.8201-324.8907, 324.8701-324.8717, 324.8901-
324.8907, 324.90101-324.90106, 324.9501-324.9510 (2006). In addi-
tion, MDEQ implements certain programs pursuant to federal law,
such as the Pollution Prevention Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13102
(2006)).
[VOL. 40:4
The Public Trust in Surface Waterways
Minnesota
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency writes rules and regu-
lations necessary to carry out the environmental protection laws set
forth in Minnesota statutes, including but not limited to Chapters
114C through 116Q. 2005 MINN. LAWS 114C-116Q.
Similarly, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources writes
rules and regulations necessary to carry out the natural resources
law set forth in Minnesota statutes, including but not limited to
Chapters 83A through 1031. 2005 MINN. LAWS 83A -1031.
New York
The statutory authority for the rules and regulations promul-
gated, implemented, and enforced by the New York Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) comes from New York's Envi-
ronmental Conservation Law. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
§§ 3-0301, 11-0303, 11-0701, 11-0715, 11-0903, 11-0907, 11-0909, 11-
0911, 11-0913, 11-0917, 11-1103 (Consol. 2006). In addition, the
commissioner of parks, recreation and historic preservation, along
with the commissioner of environmental conservation, has the
duty to administer the provisions set forth in New York's navigation
laws. N.Y. NAV. LAW art. 1-art. 13 (McKinney 2006).
New York's Office of General Services has jurisdiction over New
York's public lands, including lands under water, and administers
the New York public land laws. N.Y. PUB. LANDS art. 1-art. 17
(McKinney 2006).
Ohio
The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) carries out
the environmental laws set forth in the Ohio Revised Code and the
environmental regulations set forth in the Ohio Administrative
Code. In particular, OEPA implements the laws and regulations
pertaining to surface, drinking, and ground waters. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3745, 6111, 6117, and 6119 (Anderson 2006) and
OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-1 through 4, 3745-7, 3745-9, 3745-11,
3745-32, 3745-33, 3745-36, 3745-38 through 40, 3745-42, and 3745-
45 (2006).
The Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) carries out
rules and regulations pertaining to recreation on and conservation
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of Ohio's waterways. Specifically, ODNR's Division of Water im-
plements programs pursuant to the laws and regulations set forth
in Ohio's revised and administrative codes related to canal lands,
dam safety, floodplains, groundwater, water inventory, water with-
drawal facilities, water planning, and the water advisory council.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1501.30-35, 1506.04, 1509.39, 1517.17,
1520.01, 1521.01, 2921.13, 3747.12 (Anderson 2006) and Ohio
Admin. Code §§ 1501:1-33-01, 1501:1-33-02, 1501:1-33-03, 1501-2,
1501-7-01, 1501:21-1, 1501:22-1 (2006).
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Protection
(PDEP) is responsible for protecting natural resources, including
land and water resources, as well ensuring human health and
safety. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 25 §§ 1-1021 (West 2006). In regard to
water law, the PDEP administers the following: the Water Power
and Water Supply Permit Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 32 §§ 591 to
641 (West 2006); the Clean Stream Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 35,
§§ 691.1 to 691.1001 (West 2006); the Flood Plain Management
Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 32 §§ 679.101 to 679.601 (West 2006);
the Storm Water Management Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 32
§§ 680.1 to 680.17 (West 2006); the Dam Safety and Encroach-
ments Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 32, §§ 693.1 to 693.27 (West
2006).
The Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Re-
sources is primarily concerned with preservation and conservation
and accordingly administers the Pennsylvania Scenic Rivers Act
(2006 Pa. Laws 1277) and other laws, rules, and regulations created
pursuant to the public trust provision of the State constitution (PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27).
Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) has
regulatory authority over State navigable waterways both under the
State's public trust doctrine (WiS. CONST. art. IX, § 1) and the
State's general police powers. The Wisconsin Legislature has
charged WDNR with primary responsibility for regulating State wa-
ters. Wis. STAT. § 281.11 (2005). For example, the WDNR
regulates: 1) activities in and near surface waters, 2) drainage dis-
tricts, 3) discharges to surface waters, and 4) groundwater. Wis.
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STAT. §§ 30.01 to 30.105; 31.01 to 31.99, 88.01 to 88.94, 160.001 to
160.50, 281.01 to 281.99, 283.001 to 283.95 (2005). In addition,
WDNR protects and conserves natural resources, including State
waters. Wis. STAT. § 23.09(2) (2005).
Other State agencies also have jurisdiction over State waters.
The Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer
Protection, the Wisconsin Department of Commerce, and the Wis-
consin Department of Health and Family Services each have
jurisdiction over certain specific activities that affect State waters,
such as agricultural runoff and construction site erosion. See, e.g.,
WIs. STAT. §§ 15.135, 88.11(7), and 92.04 (2005).

